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VOL. 24 DECEMBER, 1939 No. 1
FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE AS AFFECTED BY
THE NEW RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
By WERNER ILSEN* and ROBERT E. HONEt
A LTHOUGH the title "Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States"' might imply that these rules
deal solely with the practice and procedure of the federal courts
of first instance, the subject of appeals is dealt with therein in
considerable detail. When the Advisory Committee2 first com-
menced its deliberations, doubt was expressed whether the
Enabling Act conferred power upon the Supreme Court of the
United States to prescribe rules of appellate procedure. In fact
some members of the committee, it has been said, felt that the
embodiment of any provisions as to appeals in the rules might
be resented as an intrusion on the peculiar rights and prerogatives
of the appellate courts.4 The conclusion, however, was properly
reached that such power was given, if not solely under the par-
ticular enabling statute, then-to the extent necessary-under the
various other existing statutes extending to the Supreme Court the
right to make rules of practice.; As a result, a decided simplifica-
*Member of the New York bar. Associated with the firm of Root,
Clark, Buckner & Ballantine, New York City; Professor of Law, St. John's
University School of Law, New York City.
fMember of the New York bar. Associated with the firm of Root,
Clark, Buckner & Ballantine, New York City.
'Approved by the Supreme Court of the United States December 20,
1937, effective September 16, 1938. Hereinafter referred to as F.R.C.P.
(Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.) The Federal Rules have also been
made applicable to civil actions and proceedings in Hawaii, Public Act
No. 133, 76th Congress, 1st Session (Approved June 19, 1939).
2Orders of Supreme Court: June 3, 1935, October Term 1934, 295 U. S.
774; February 17, 1936, Oct. Term 1935, 297 U. S. 731.
328 U. S. C. secs. 723b, 723c.
4Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (1939) 25 Va. L.
Rev. 261, 305.
'Foreword to Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure, May,
1936, pp. XI-XII; Clark, Power of Supreme Court to Make Rules of
Appellate Procedure, (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1303.
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tion of the mechanics of appellate procedure has been attained-
a modernization which indeed had long been overdue.
Only procedural matters with respect to appeals have, of
course, been covered by the rules. The subject of appellate juris-
diction remains unchanged, 6 since it was not within the scope of
the enabling statute.7 The cases in which and the time within which
an appeal may be taken or certiorari may be applied for (except
as pointed out later) have not and could not be changed, but the
mechanical steps to be followed in order to obtain review, and, in
fact, the extent of review in certain cases, have been altered to a
large degree.
In order properly to determine the changes made in appellate
review and procedure, certain rules dealing with the subject of
"Trials" will first be considered.
THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
The right to trial by jury according to the rules of the com-
mon law as directed in the Enabling Acts is of course preserved,*
but a method of waiver of jury trial has been provided for-
an innovation in federal practice, although it has been followed
successfully in many jurisdictions.1 0 Thus if a jury trial
is desired of all or some of the issues it must be affirmatively
demanded,11 but there is no constructive waiver of the right to
jury trial of legal issues merely because they are mingled with
equitable ones.1 2  Failure of any party to make a timely demand
GF. R. C. P. 82.
728 U. S. C. secs. 723b, 723c.
828 U. S. C. secs. 723b, 723c.
9F. R. C. P. 38 (a).1OF. R. C. P. 38(b); cf. notes of Advisory Committee to this rule.
Formerly if trial by jury was waived other than as prescribed in 28 U. S. C.
secs. 773, 875, review on the merits was extremely limited, see p. 23, infra.
'IF. R. C. P. 38(b) and (c) ; cf. 28 U. S. C. see. 384 ("suits in equity
shall not be sustained . .. in any case where a plain, adequate and com-
plete remedy may be had at law") ; sec 770 (trial of issues of fact
. . . in all causes except cases in equity and cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, and except as otherwise provided in proceeding
in bankruptcy, shall be by jury"); sec. 773 (requiring written stipula-
tion to be filed to effect waiver of jury, amended May 29, 1930 (46 Stat.
at L. 486, ch. 357) so as to allow waiver of jury by oral stipulation in
open court); and Smith v. American Nat'l Bank, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1898)
89 Fed. 828 at 838: "Taking this section [28 U.S.C.A. sec. 384] in con-
nection with [28 U.S.C.A. secs. 770, 773] . . . it is perfectly clear that
congress, by this legislation, intended to preserve to all litigants a right
deemed both valuable and sacred."
12F. R. C. P. 38(a); Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Burger
(S.D. N.Y., 1939) 27 F. Supp. 554 holding that defendant pleading a
legal counterclaim to an action for equitable relief is entitled to a jury trial
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for a jury constitutes a waiver by him of all rights he may have
to a jury trial, except that the trial court, in its discretion, despite
the failure of a party to make such a demand, may upon motion
order a trial by jury of any or all issues in which such demand
might have been made of right. 8
The effect of such a jury trial for purposes of review may
cause some divergence of opinion in the appellate courts, since
there is no specific provision that the case shall then proceed as if
it were tried to the jury as a matter of right.14 Does the rule,
therefore, present a jury form of appellate review to the extent
that a jury trial is granted by the court? The answer should be
in the affirmative.
In actions not triable of right by a jury, the power of the
court to call in an advisory jury is of course preserved.15 The
rule further provides that in all actions (except where the
United States is defendant and a statute of the United States
provides for trial without jury), the court, on the consent of all
parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict shall have
the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right.
Thus, it would seem that a jury form of review is required.16
Provision is also made that the parties, in cases in which a jury
is guaranteed by the seventh amendment and demand therefor
has been duly made, may consent, by stipulation made in open
court and entered in the record, to trial by the court sitting
of his counterclaim. Cf. American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co.,
(1922) 260 U. S. 360, 43 Sup. Ct. 149, 67 L. Ed. 306, case under Equity
Rule 30; Auerbach v. Chase Nat'l Bank, (1937) 251 App. Div. 543,
296 N. Y. S. 487, holding that where plaintiff joined two causes of action,
one at law and the other in equity, he has waived his right to a jury.
13F. R. C. P. 38(d), 39(b); Gunther v. H. W. Gossard Co., (S.D.
N.Y. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 995; see Alfred Hoffman Inc. v. Textile Machine
Wks., (E.D. Pa. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 431, 432, where the court in denying leave
to file jury demand after the time had expired said: "In spite of the lack
of unanimity among the various courts which have had occasion to pass
upon the validity of the patent, which may be a ground for the plaintiff's
apparent faith that the technical injuries involved will be better under-
stood by the average citizen than by a judge, this seems to me to be a
conspicuous example of the kind of case which ought not to be tried
by a jury." See also Rogers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., (S.D. N.Y.
"1939) 26 F. Supp. 707 and Buggeln & Smith v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
(S.D. N. Y. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 399. Although there has been no decision
on the point, it would seem that a jury demand may be filed within ten
days after the service of a pleading amended as of right; to hold otherwise
would be to construe "last pleading" in F. R. C. P. 38(b) to mean "last
original pleading."
14F. R. C. P. 39(b).
'5F. R. C. P. 39(c).
16F. R. C. P. 39(c).
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without a jury." Furthermore, a court, upon motion or sua
sponte, may, where it finds that the right to trial by jury of some
or all of the issues does not exist under the constitution or statutes
of the United States, direct that the trial be without a jury as to
those issues, although demand therefor had been made.' 8 In other
words, service of the demand for a jury trial cannot create a right
to jury trial not existing at common law. There is also a provision
to protect the unwary, which states that a demand for trial by
jury made as prescribed by the rules, may not be withdrawn
without the consent of the parties.'
In the Preliminary Draft of the Rules of Civil Procedure of
May, 1936,20 there was a requirement which is not in the present
rules, to the effect that where certain of the issues are to be tried
by the jury and others by the court, the court may determine the
sequence in which such issues should be tried. Does this omission
imply that the former practice of trying so-called equitable issues,
first, is to be continued? The answer should be in the affirmative. 2
TESTIMONY AND OBJECTIONS
No change has been made in the requirement that in all trials,
whether formerly denominated law or equity, the testimony of
witnesses must be taken orally in open court. 22 Formal excep-
tions to rulings or orders of the court are no longer necessary. 2,
The rule to this extent is a wise one. But it continues by stating
that, "for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore
been necessary" it shall be sufficient that a party at the time the
ruling or order was made or sought, makes known to the court
"7F. R. C. P. 39(a).
18F. R. C. P. 39 (a).19F. R. C. P. 38(d).
20 Rule 46.
2Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, (1922) 260 U. S. 235, 43 Sup.
Ct. 118, 67 L. Ed. 232: "Where an equitable defense is interposed to a suit
at law, the equitable issue raised should first be disposed of as in a court of
equity, and then, if an issue at law remains, it is triable to a jury." See
also F. R. C. P. 42(b), and Union Central Life Ins. Co. v, Burger,
(S.D. N.Y. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 554, holding that when a legal counterclaim
is set up in an equity action, the equitable issue should be disposed of first,
after which, the trial of the legal issues may proceed; Frissell v. Rateau
Drug Store, Inc. (W.D. La. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 816; 3 Moore, Federal
Practice (1938) 3032. Query, whether the decision in Enelow v. New
York Life Ins. Co., (1935) 293 U. S. 379, 55 Sun. Ct. 310, 79 L. Ed.
440, is still law that an order directing trial of equitable defenses first is
appealable under 28 U. S. C., Sec. 227, as an interlocutory decree granting
an injunction.
22F. R. C. P. 43(a) ; cf. 28 U.S.C. sec. 635 and Equity Rule 46.
23F. R. C. P. 46.
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the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to
the action of the court and his grounds therefor. This provision
as an instrument of trial procedure seems nothing more than a
change in name,2 4 and in respect of appellate review, an exception
under the changed name of "objection" may be and probably will
be held as formerly, a necessary prerequisite to appellate review."
Furthermore, it still seems to be necessary that an objection must
be tendered at the time of the ruling or order of the court com-
plained of, and not thereafter. If a party has no opportunity to
object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence
of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him. 8
In jury cases, precise objections to the court's charge to the
jury are continued. 27  No party may assign as error the giving or
failing to give an instruction to the jury unless he objects thereto
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly
the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.28
The rule also provides that opportunity must be given to make
the objection out of the hearing of the jury. Of course, no pro-
vision is made in respect of the extent of the comment the trial
judge may make to the jury. The well-established federal prac-
tice still continues that the judge must instruct the jury as to the
law and may advise it as to the evidence.2 9
GENERAL VERDICTS, SPECIAL VERDICTS, GENERAL VERDICTS WITH
INTERROGATORIES, DIRECTED VERDICTS AND JUDGMENTS
NOTWITIISTANDING THE VERDICT
Three methods of fact determination by juries are established:
(1) by a general verdict only; (2) by a general verdict with writ-
ten interrogatories upon one or more material issues of fact ;' or
24Cf. New York C. P. A. secs. 445, 553, sub. 2.
2 5See infra, notes 263-265 and text.
26F. R. C. P. 46.
27F. R. C. P. 51.
2 SF. R. C. P. 51; Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co.,
(1933) 287 U. S. 474, 53 Sup. Ct. 252, 77 L. Ed. 439; cf. New York
C. P. A. sec. 446, which apparently permits exceptions to be taken at any
time before the jury have rendered their verdict.
LFIFederal Rules of Procedure and Proceedings of the American Bar
Association (Cleveland, 1938) 320; Vicksburg, etc., Railroad Co. v. Putnam,(1886) 118 U. S. 545. 7 Sun. Ct. 1, 30 L. Ed. 257. see Canital Traction
Company v. Hof, (1899) 174 U. S. 1, 13, 19 Sup. Ct. 580, 43 L. Ed. 873;
Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., (1931) 283 U. S. 91, 95, 51 Sup. Ct. 383, 75
L. Ed. 857. Bills have been introduced in Congress denying federal judges
the power to comment on the evidence, except to the extent authorized by
state practice. H.R. 4721 (75th Congress), H.R. 8892 (76th Congress). It
is hoped that this change will not be adopted.
80F. R. C. P. 49(b) : "Issue of fact the decision of which is necessary
to a verdict." See infra, note 31.
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(3) by written findings only on each issue of fact, i.e., a "special
verdict."' The court has discretion as to whether a special or
general verdict with or without interrogatories is to be returned.
1. General Verdict.-There is nothing new contained in the
rules with respect to the general verdict. As previously stated,
no party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to
consider its verdict.3
2. Special Verdict.-Possibly one of the more significant
changes in appellate practice results from the special verdict.
The rules state that the court may submit written questions sus-
ceptible of categorical or other brief answer, or may submit
written forms of the several special findings which might prop-
erly be made under the pleadings and evidence, or may use such
other method of submitting the issues and requiring the written
findings as it deems most appropriate. 8 One of the unfortunate
developments in the former federal practice was the increasingly
infrequent use of the special verdict 84 for, although it had out-
lived its original purpose-to relieve jurors of liability for mis-
takes of law 8s--yet its importance as a device for obtaining more
truthful and just decisions than is possible by use of the general
verdict and its utility in localizing errors and exempting sound
portions of a verdict from the necessity of retrial has been
recognized. 6
3'F. R. C. P. 49(a): "The court may require a jury to return only
• . . a special written finding upon each issue of fact." That the answers
of a special verdict must be statements of material facts, Monticello
Bank v. Bostwick, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1896) 77 Fed. 123: "A special finding
of fact, to be of any avail, must be a statement of the ultimate facts
rather than the evidence on which the ultimate facts rest. A special
finding is necessarily imperfect and insufficient if it devolves upon the
court the duty of deducing from the evidence the ultimate conclusion on a
material issue of fact which the jury ought to draw." If the findings under
49(a) must be of material facts, it would seem that answers to interroga-
tories proposed under 49(b) must also be statements of material fact, for
not only does 49(b) emphasize that the interrogatories are to be based on
issues necessary to a verdict, but it is contemplated that where the answer
to an interrogatory is inconsistent with the general verdict, the latter may
be ignored and judgment entered upon the answers. And in that case it
would seem that the answers would have to meet the specifications of find-
ings under 49(a).32F. R. C. P. 51; U. S. Sup. Ct. Rule 8, 306 U. S. (1939); see
supra, p. 5 and note 28.33F. R. C. P. 49(a).84The disuse was caused by the strict requirements as to form which
were closely adhered to by the federal courts. See p. 7, infra.
35Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interroga-
tories, (1933) 32 Yale L. J. 575, 599.
36Sunderland, Verdicts General and Special, (1920) 29 Yale L. J. 253,
257, et seq.
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The Advisory Committee, by using the Wisconsin statutory
scheme as a model, 37 has attempted to relieve special verdicts of
the unnecessary hazards to which they have heretofore been sub-
jected upon appeal. Under the former federal practice, appellate
courts made no presumptions in favor of judgments based on
special verdicts; defects no matter how insubstantial were suffi-
cient for reversal. 38 Findings as to all material issues of the action
were necessary,30 even though there were sufficient evidentiary
facts stated in the verdict to establish a material fact,4 0 and in
those verdicts where a material fact was omitted, the courts did
not distinguish between cases where the jury failed to make a find-
ing on a material issue actually submitted to it and cases where,
through inadvertence of the court and counsel, one or more mate-
rial issues were not presented to the jury for its determination, 1
even though the issue was undisputed as long as it was not ad-
mitted by the pleadings. 42  The courts have gone so far as to say
that the silence of the special verdict on a material issue was the
equivalent of an express finding against the party having the
burden of proof.43
It may be that this attitude was based on the strict construction
of the seventh amendment preserving the right to trial by jury.44
37Notes of Advisory Committee to F. R. C. P. 49(a); Green, A New
Development in Jury Trial, (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 715; Sunderland, The
New Federal Rules, (1938) 45 W. Va. L Q. 5. The Wisconsin practice in
regard to special verdicts has been reported as successful, Tolman's Dis-
cussion of Rule 49 at New York Symposium of Civil Procedure, Proceed-
ings of Institutes (1938), p. 280. With F. R. C. P. 49(a) compare Wis.
Stat. (1933), secs. 270.27, 270.28, 270.30. See generally The Special Verdict
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (1939) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 96.
38Comment, (1936) 15 Tex. L. Rev. 396.30Chesapeake Ins. Co. v. Stark, (1810) 6 Cranch (U.S.) 268, 3 L. Ed.
220; 3 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 3097.4OBarnes v. Williams, (1826) 11 Wheat. (U.S.) 415, 6 L. Ed. 508;
Monticello Bank v. Bostwick, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1896) 77 Fed. 123.4lWith Barnes v. Williams, (1826) 11 Wheat. (U.S.) 415, 6 L. Ed.
508, compare Hodges v. Easton, (1882) 106 U. S. 408, 1 Sup. Ct. 307,
27 L. Ed. 169, and Daube v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1897) 77 Fed. 713.42Daube v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1897)
77 Fed. 713.43Daube v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1897)
77 Fed. 713.44See Hodges v. Easton, (1882) 106 U. S. 408, 412, 1 Sup. Ct. 307, 27
L. Ed. 169, where the court said: "The court could not, consistently with
the constitutional right of trial by jury, submit a part of the facts to thejury, and, itself, determine the remainder without a waiver by the de-
fendants of a verdict by the jury. . . . It has been often said by this
court that the trial by jury is a fundamental guarantee of the rights and
liberties of the people. Consequently, every reasonable presumption should
be indulged against its waiver."
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The federal rules, however, appear to reverse this previously
existing attitude so that now waiver of trial by jury is to be
encouraged.4"
It is by an extension of this new doctrine that means have
been found to remedy the harsh treatment formerly accorded
judgments entered on special verdicts. The rules provide that
if there is a failure to submit a material issue to the jury, waiver
of trial by jury as to that issue is implied and the trial court may
make the essential findings of fact; but should the judge fail to
perceive the omission and make no finding, it shall then be im-
plied that the trial court made the finding in accord with the
judgment on the special verdict.46 Thus, by the use of these two
fictions, it may no longer be urged on appeal for the purpose of
obtaining-a reversal that the special verdict is defective because
of failure to submit a material issue to the jury.47  If there is,
however, a failure to find all the material facts because the jury
answers some issues by stating evidentiary facts or conclusions
which are but conclusions of law, a special verdict may still be
defective.48  If the jury fails to return any answer to a material
issue actually submitted to them, the defeated party would be
entitled to a new trial,49 but only as to that issue, 0 unless a sepa-
45Supra, p. 2 et seq.
46F. R. C. P. 49(a): "If . . . the court omits any issue of fact
raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to
a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he
demands its submission to the jury. [Cf. N. Y. C. P. A., (1938) sec. 445.1
As to an issue omitted without such demand, the court may make a finding;
or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have" made a finding in accord
with the judgment on the special verdict." Hinshaw v. New England Mut.
Life Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 8th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 45.
47For the convenience of appellate courts, it is quite important that the
answers of thfe jury together with the findings of the trial judge should
cover all the material issues and should be properly formulated; also, it
would seem desirable that the trial judge submit with his findings or the
special verdict a recital of all the facts which he deems material to thejudgment, which are brought out by the pleadings but admitted therein.
The making of such a recital would relieve appellate courts of the burden
of examining the pleadings to discover these essential facts.
4sMonticello Bank v. Bostwick, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1896) 77 Fed. 123
(evidentiary facts); Sunderland, Verdicts General and Special, (1920) 29
Yale L. J. 253, at 261.
49Chesapeake Ins. Co. v. Stark, (1810) 6 Cranch (U.S.) 268, 3 L. Ed.
220.
'OF. R. C. P. 59: "A new trial may be granted . . .on all or part
of the issues;" see Gasoline Products, Inc. v. Champlin Ref. Co., (1913)
283 U. S. 494, 498, 51 Sup. Ct. 513, 75 L. Ed. 1188 where it is stated: "If in
the present case the jury has found, in accordance with the applicable legal
rules, the amount due to petitioner on the contract for royalties and all
the elements fixing its liability on the treating plant contract, there is no
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rate trial on that issue alone would be prejudicial.5 ' Likewise, for
a special verdict to withstand attack on appeal, the answers must
be consistent.5 2
Although the rule as to special verdicts eliminates many prob-
lems, some new ones may arise. A jury case, where the com-
plaint purports to state two "claims"'" in one count54 based on
the same factual situation but differing as to some of their
material issues and the trial court fails either to submit to the
jury the material issues distinguishing the two claims from one
another or fails to make its own express findings on such issues,
may cause difficulties at times. Assume a case arising in Cali-
fornia where plaintiff has been induced through defendant's fraud,
in misrepresenting the value of the collateral, to purchase an in-
constitutional requirement that those issues should again be sent to a jury,
merely because the exigencies of the litigation require that a separable
issue be tried again;" Schuerholz v. Roach, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1932) 58
F. (2d) 32, 33; Simmons v. Fish, (1912) 210 Mass. 563, 565, 97 N. E.
102, 103; Tuttle v. Tuttle, (1907) 146 N. C. 484, 59 S. E. 1008; but see
Hodges v. Easton, (1882) 106 U. S. 408, 412 et seq., 1 Sup. Ct. 307, 27
L. Ed. 169.5'Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., (1913) 283 -U. S. 494,
500, 51 Sup. Ct. 513, 75 L. Ed. 1188: "Where the practice permits a partial
new trial, it may not properly be resorted to unless it clearly appears that
the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others that a
trial of it alone may be had without injustice"; 3 Moore, Federal Practice
(1938) 3248-9.
52 Mounger v. Wells, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 521, where
the court also made the comment: "It is unfortunate that the case was
submitted to the jury for a special verdict. No doubt they were confused
in answering the questions clearly, as, if either was answered, 'yes,' the
other should have been answered, 'no,' to be consistent. It would have
been simpler and more conclusive to have left the whole case to the jury
for a general verdict;" cf. F. R. C. P. 49(b) (general verdict accom-
panied by answer to interrogatories), which provides that when "the answers
are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent
with the general verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of judgment
but may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and ver-
dict or may order a new trial."
53F. R. C. P. 8: "claim" is the substitute but not necessarily a
synonym for "cause of action;" cf. Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Juris-
dictional Limitations of Federal Procedure, (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 393, 397:
"A vast amount of legal scholarship has been expended on attempts to
define a generalized concept of 'cause of action.' Apparently, the search
has been vain,-or rather, successful in establishing that 'a cause of action'
may mean one thing for one purpose and something different for another."
cf. Elliott v. Mosgrove, (Or., 1939) 93 P. (2d) 1070, for extended discus-
sion of construction to be given "claim for relief" and "cause of action."
Likewise, Judge Clark in a recent concurring opinion emphasizes the
variable character of "claim" and that under the federal rules the extent
of a "claim" should depend not on legal rights, but upon a lay view of the
past events which have given rise to the litigation, that the outer limits of
this variable concept should depend to a considerable extent upon the pur-
pose for which the concept is being immediately used. Collins v. Metro-
Goldwvn Pictures Corporation, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 83, 87.
54F. R. C. P. 10(b).
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stalment promissory note, the payment of which is guaranteed by
defendant, and thereafter the mortgagor or pledgor defaults in the
payment of a $2,000 instalment. The purchaser sues the guarantor
for recovery of the instalment, and for damages resulting from
the fraud, and asks for $5,000 total damages."5 These claims
differ as to several issues, including: (a) measure of damages;,"
(b) time within which an action may be commenced after the
claim arises ;57 and (c) intent to defraud, 8 which issue, of course,
is material only to the claim based on fraud. If such case is sent
to the jury for a special verdict but the issues on how long '-
claims have been in existence and as to the intent to defrat dre
not submitted to the jury, and the court makes no findings thereon
but the jury finds that plaintiff's damages were $3,000, the ques-
tion then arises whether the court should imply findings of fact
consistent with the amount of damages awarded or remand the
case for further findings. It is submitted that the latter alterna-
tive is proper, for to adopt the first suggestion might blind the
appellate court to possible errors of law committed by the trial
court. For instance, the amount of damages awarded might be
based on either: (1) a misconception as to the measure of dam-
ages established by law for each of the two theories; (2) an error
as to the length of time within which plaintiff may maintain either
of the claims; or (3) an error in determining whether intent is
an essential element in a claim based on fraud; rather than on a
factual determination of the time when the transaction occurred,
or when the fraud was discovered by plaintiff, or whether there
was intent to defraud on the part of defendant.5 9
55F. R. C. P. 8(e) (2) "A party may set forth two or more state-
ments of a claim . . . alternatively. . ..50Calif. Civ. Code (Deering, 1937) sec. 3302 ("The detriment caused
by the breach of an obligation to pay money only, is deemed to he the
amount due by the terms of the obligation, with interest thereon."); sec.
3333 ("For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the
measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this
code, is the amount which will compensate for all of the detriment proxi-
mately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not.");
sec. 3294 ("In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract, where the defendant has been guilty of . . . fraud . . . the
plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the
sake of example and by way of punishinz the defendant").57Cal. Code Civ. Pro. (Deering. 1937), sec. 337 (action on a written
contract must be commenced within four years) ; sec. 338 (action for relief
on the ground of fraud must be commenced within three years after dis-
covery of the facts constituting the fraud).58Hall v. Mitchell. (1922) 59 Cal. App. 743. 211 Pac. 853: see Hodg-
kins v. Dunham, (1909) 10 Cal. App. 690, 698, 103 Pac. 351, 355.
5 0This case seems a fair example: many situations presenting this
problem of implied findings will no doubt arise.
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In this connection a peculiar interpretation of a Texas statute
which similarly provides for implied findings on omitted issues
might well be noted. 60 The Texas courts will imply only
such findings on "omitted issues as are in accord with, and
supplemental or incidental to, and which support, the issues of
fact which were submitted and found by the jury, upon which
the judgment is based."'" They will not imply findings on "issues
in the case which are independent causes of action in themselves
or controlling and independent grounds of recovery, or indepen-
dent grounds of defense."'12  As might well be expected it is
rather difficult at times to determine what constitutes an inde-
pendent ground of recovery or defense.6 '
There is nothing in Rule 49(a) to justify such an interpreta-
tion. On the contrary, it is provided that the remedial fictions
are to be operative if the court, in submitting the case, omits any
issue. The Wisconsin courts, in interpreting a similar statute,
which, as previously stated, has served as a model for the federal
ruler1 have held that such provision applies to any omitted issue,
even though the evidence is conflicting " or though the omitted
issue constitutes a separate ground of recovery.or defense;66 the
judge may make also an express finding on any issue omitted, and
such finding is not a violation of the right to jury trial, since the
failure to request a finding on an issue operates as a waiver of
jury trial." This, it seems, is the better method of function-
ing under special verdicts, since it would appear more desirable
to dispose of appeals according to the peculiar problems of each
case and to refrain from implying findings only in those instances
where the result would be to hide errors of law from view.
Another, problem as to the type of judgment to be tendered by
the appellate court arises when there has been an erroneous ex-
6oTexas, Vernon's Ann. Civ. Stat. (Supp., 1936) Art. 2190: ".
an issue not submitted and not requested is deemed. as found by the
court in such manner as to support a judgment if there is evidence to
sustain such finding."
61Ormsby v. Ratcliffe, (1928) 117 Tex. 248, 1 S. W. (2d) 1084.
62Ormsby v. Ratcliffe, (1928) 117 Tex. 248, 1 S. W. (2d) 1084.
83See Comment, (1936) 14 Tex. L. Rev. 538.
64Supra, note 37.65Snith v. Reed, (1910) 141 Wis. 483, 124 N. W. 489; Kline v.
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., (1935) 217 Wis. 21, 258 N. W. 370.
6GSmith v. Reed, (1910) 141 Wis. 483, 124 N. W. 489 (counter-claim);
Gegare v. Fox River Land & Loan Co., (1913) 152 Wis. 548, 140 N. W.
305 (negligence of broker in failing to procure insurance) ; Gist v. John-
son-Carey Co., (1914) 158 Wis. 188, 147 N. W. 1079, Ann. Cas. 1916E
460 (accord and satisfaction).67Wisconsin Stat. (1933) sec. 270.28; cf. F. R. C. P. 49(a).
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clusion of evidence on a material issue, as to which issue there
has been an implied waiver of trial by jury by virtue of Rule
49(a). Shall the trial court be directed to take testimony and
amend its findings, or shall a retrial be ordered, thus permitting
the parties to determine according to Rule 38 whether the retrial
shall be by jury? The latter course seems preferable. The pur-
pose of the implied waiver was to protect judgments on technically
defective special verdicts, 8 and not to deprive litigants of trial
by jury.
3. General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to Interrogatories.
-Provision is also made for the court in its discretion to sub-
mit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general
verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact
the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. 69 The court must
give such explanation as may be necessary to enable the jury both
to make answers to the interrogatories and to render a general
verdict, and must direct the jury both to make written answers
and to render a general verdict. This is a very helpful rule, since
the procedure as outlined will operate to check the correctness of
the general verdict and compel the jury to give a detailed con-
sideration to one or more important issues.70 If the general verdict
and the answers to the interrogatories are consistent, the court
must direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. 1
The rules also take care of cases where there is inconsistency.
Under the former practice, it was generally the rule that if the
answers to interrogatories were inconsistent with the general
verdict, the answers were controlling,7 2 when they clearly com-
pelled a different judgment from that which would follow the
general verdict. The rule, however, goes a step further and states
that if the answers are consistent with each other, but one or
more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court has the
O8 Supra, p. 8.
69F. R. C. P. 49(b).
7 0Wicker, Special Interrogatories in Civil Cases, (1926) 35 Yale L..
296: "Where special interrogatories are submitted, jurors are compelled to
do more than toss a coin and keep still about it or give plaintiffs verdicts
largely on principle that the plaintiff is indigent and needs the money and
defendant is unpopular and able to pay." Wicker, Trials and New Trials
Under the New Federal Rule, (1939) 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 551, 570.
7'F. R. C. P. 49(b).
72Victor-American Fuel Co. v. Peccarich, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1913) 209
Fed. 568; United States v. McPhee, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1929) 31 F. (2d)
243; 3 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 3100; cf. Walker v. Southern
Pacific Railroad, (1897) 165 U. S. 593, 17 Sup. Ct. 421, 41 L. Ed. 837,(holding that entry of judgment on the special findings does not impair the
rights of trial by jury).
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choice of (1) directing entry of judgment in accordance with
the answers notwithstanding the general verdict, (2) returning
the jury for further consideration of the answers and verdict, or
(3) ordering a new trial.73 It would seem, however, that the court
cannot properly direct entry of judgment in accordance with the
ans-wers unless they are sufficiently complete to compel a judgment
different from that which would follow the general verdictJ.4  In
other words, findings will not be implied as is prescribed in the
subdivision dealing with special verdicts,7 5 except possibly where
it is clear that the interrogatories were intended to and did to a
great extent cover "each issue of fact" in the action. Under no
circumstances should the court make an express finding as to an
issue omitted by the interrogatories, since it does not appear that
there has been any waiver by the parties of their right of trial
by jury. On the contrary, the parties were relying upon the
general verdict of a jury, in addition to the jury's answers to
special interrogatories.
If the answers are also inconsistent with each other and one
or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, it fol-
lows that the court cannot enter judgment upon the basis of the
answers to the interrogatories, but must return the jury for further
consideration of its answers and verdict or order a new trial.7 6
The restrictions on reexamination of the facts in general and
special verdicts and interrogatories are necessarily continued under
the federal rules, since the seventh amendment to the constitu-
tion provides that:
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law. ' 77
73F. R. C. P. 49(b).74See note 72, supra.
7rF. R. C. P. 49(a).
73F. R. C. P. 49(b) ; in F. R. C. P. 49(a) the word "interrogatory" is
not used; in 49(b) the expressions "written findings" and "special verdict"
do not appear. The device of a general verdict and answers to interroga-
tories is of course distinct from a special verdict. In most cases, the
legal problems arising under the two subdivisions of Rule 49 will be dif-
ferent. It would be conducive to accurate analysis if the federal judges
would adopt the careful method of the Advisory Committee and confine
the formulative terms to the meanings originally ascribed to them by 49(a)
and 49(b). Unfortunately, the district courts have already started the
process of careless terminology. See Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Roach,(D. C. Md., 1939) 25 F. Supp. 852.7 7United States constitution, seventh amendment; F. R. C. P. 38(a);
see Parsons v. Bedford, (1830) 3 Pet. (U.S.) 433, 448, 7 L. Ed. 732.
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Obviously, there are no provisions in the federal rules govern-
ing the scope of review in jury cases. 78
Appellate review in jury cases extends solely to questions of
law, including inquiry as to whether the facts are supported by
any substantial evidence (which is deemed a question of law) 79
but not to the question whether the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence.8 0
If the Supreme Court decides that the permissible degree of
reexamination of facts under Rule 52 (findings of fact by the
court in non-jury cases) 8 ' differs from that prevailing as to
jury findings, judgments based on special verdicts, together
with findings (actual or implied) on issues as to which there
was implied waiver of trial by jury under 49 (a), will raise
an additional question as to scope of review. Where there is by
virtue of Rule 3882 a deliberate waiver of trial by jury on some
of the material issues in the action, the judge's findings on those
issues should be reviewed according to Rule 52,83 but where find-
78With respect to non-jury cases, however, a change has been made,
since it was felt that a failure to establish- the scope of review for non-jury actions would result in a continuation of the previously existing dis-
tinction in the classification of non-jury cases. See note to the Supreme
Court following Proposed Rule 68 (Preliminary Draft, 1936) and Pro-
posed Rule 59 (Draft of 1937).
79See Lancaster v. Collins, (1885) 115 U. S. 222, 225, 6 Sup. Ct. 33,
29 L. Ed. 373, where the court said, "This court cannot review the weight
of the evidence, and can look into it only to see whether there was error
in not directing a verdict for the plaintiff on the question of variance, or
because there was no evidence to sustain the verdict rendered;" Boatmens
Bank v. Trower Bros. Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1910) 181 Fed. 804, 806,
where the following quotation appears: "The only instance in which the
finding of a fact by a jury may be re-examined and avoided by a court is
where there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, and the review of the
findings of fact in an action at law by a court, or a consent referee, is
limited by the same restriction;" Bank of Waterproof v. Fidelity & De-
posit Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1924) 299 Fed. 478, 481. That a motion for a
directed verdict is necessary to raise the question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict of a jury, see Baten v. Kirby Lumber Cor-
poration, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 272, 273, 274.
8oSee Erie R. R. v. Winter, (1892) 143 U. S. 60, 75, 12 Sup. Ct. 356,
36 L. Ed. 71; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, (1891) 140 U. S. 76, 91, 11
Sup. Ct. 720, 35 L. Ed. 371, where the court said: "It may be that if we
were to usurp the functions of the jury and determine the weight to be
given to the evidence, we might arrive at a different conclusion. But that
is not our province on a writ of error. In such a case we are confined to
the consideration of exceptions, taken at the trial, to the admission or re-jection of evidence and to the charge of the court and its refusals to
charge. We have no concern with questions of fact, or the weight to be
given to the evidence which was properly admitted." See also Lancaster v.
Collins, (1885) 115 U. S. 222, 6 Sup. Ct. 33, 29 L. Ed. 373.8 See infra pp. 33-34.
s2See supra p. 2.
s3See infra p. 20.
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ings are made because of an implied waiver there is legitimate
ground for doubt; for although on a conceptual basis Rule 52
might be considered as applicable inasmuch as these findings are
"findings by the court," yet the effect of applying Rule 52 would
be to subject material issues to a form of review not contemplated
by the parties and thus cause Rule 49 to go beyond the purpose of
the remedial provisions therein incorporated.
On the other hand, due to the liberal provisions for joinder
of claims8 4 and the provisions for the form of trial,85 it should be
a common occurrence for some issues in an action to be tried to a
jury and other issues to be tried to the court and, therefore, such
cases as to scope of review on appeal will be governed by two sets
of rules.8 6 That being the case, it hardly seems desirable or ex-
pedient to introduce new complexities in appellate practice by dis-
tinguishing between findings on the basis of whether they exist
because of Rules 38 and 39 or because of Rule 49.
It seems that the problem which will occur most frequently
in connection with verdicts will be whether the written findings
or answers to interrogatories state material facts rather than
evidentiary facts or conclusions of law. This difficulty is hard to
avoid, because the courts and counsel usually have not sufficient
time during a trial to a jury carefully to study and analyze the
proposed findings. It has been suggested that, inasmuch as plead-
ings have been simplified under modern rules of practice, the
pleadings themselves be used as a foundation for the questions to
be put to the jury. 7 If this were done, much error could be
eliminated, because the parties have adequate time to test the
sufficiency of the pleadings before the case reaches trial. Accord-
ingly, if the pleadings are used as the basis of findings or answers,
there would be no objections to the form of the verdict in most
cases unless the pleadings themselves were fatally defective. No
provision for such method of procedure has, however, been spe-
cifically prescribed.8
4. Directed Verdict.-The technical provisions governing mo-
tions for a directed verdict have been eliminated, since the for-
mality of an express reservation of rights against waiver is no
84F. R. C. P. 8(a)(3), 8(e)(2), 10(b), 18(a).
85F. R. C. P. 38 and 39.
S6F. R. C. P. 52; although this rule refers to "... all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury . . .' it would seem that the word "issues"
is intended. See infra p. 20.
s8 Sunderland, Verdicts General and Special, (1920) 29 Yale L. J. 253,
262 et seq.88F. R. C. P. 49 and 52.
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longer necessary. 9 It is now provided that a party who moves
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by the
opponent may offer evidence in the event the motion is denied
without having reserved the right so to do, and to the same ex-
tent "as if the motion had not been made ;9o and after the plaintiff
has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant,
without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion
is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief upon the facts and the
law.' 1 Furthermore, the rule states that a motion for a directed
verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury, even
though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts.
2
Thus, the unnecessary formalities formerly required in the fed-
eral courts and still required 'in many state courts have been
abolished. For the protection of the parties and the assistance
of the trial and appellate courts it is wisely prescribed that a
motion for a directed verdict must state the specific grounds
therefor.9 3 Although there need be no reservation in order that
a party may offer evidence if his motion for a directed verdict or
for a dismissal made at the close of his opponent's evidence is
denied, it would seem that the motions must be renewed at the
close of all the evidence in order to obtain review of the trial
judge's denial of such motions. 94
5. Judgments Notwithstanding the Verdict.-The rules also
deal with the right of a trial judge in a jury case to take verdicts
subject to the ultimate ruling on the questions reserved-the
reservation carrying with it authority to make such ultimate dis-
pos'tion of the case as may be essential to the ruling under the
89F. R. C. P. 50; cf. Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., (1920)
254 U. S. 233, 41 Sup. Ct. 79, 65 L. Ed. 240; Union Indemnity Co. v.
United States, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1935) 74 F. (2d) 645.
90F. R. C. P. 50.
91F. R. C. P. 41(b).
92F. R. C. P. 50(a).
93F. R. C. P. 50(a); Virginia-Carolina Tie & Wood Co. v. Dunbar,
(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 383; this requirement settles the conflict
in the federal cases. See Simkins. Federal Practice (1934) sec. 189: Ken-
nedy Lumber Co. v. Rickborn, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 228;
Standard Oil Co. v. Noakes, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 897;
Balaklala Consol. Copper Co. v. Reardon, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1915) 220 Fed.
584; Adams v. Shirk, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1900) 104 Fed. 54, rehearing denied,
(1901) 105 Fed. 659.
94Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Commercial Bank, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1930)
39 F. (2d) 826; United States v. Alberty, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1933) 63 F.
(2d) 965; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co..
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 585; 3 Moore, Federal Practice (1938)
3106.
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reservation, such as entering a verdict or judgment for a party
where the jury has given a verdict for the other or ordering a
new trial. Thus it is provided that whenever a motion for a
directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or
for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have sub-
mitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of
the legal questions raised by the motion. Within ten days after
the verdict has been received or within ten days after the jury
has been discharged if no verdict has been returned, the moving
party may move for a directed verdict in his favor and to set aside
the verdict if a verdict was returned. A motion for a new trial
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be asked for
in the alternative. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict is
made under these circumstances the court may (1) if a verdict was
returned (a) allow the verdict and judgment to stand or (b) re-
open the judgment and direct the entry of judgment as if the
requested verdict had been directed or order a new trial; (2) if
no verdict was returned (a) direct the entry of judgment as if the
requested verdict had been directed or (b) order a new trial.
The case of Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co."" was the cause
of a great deal of uncertainty in connection with judgments not-
withstanding the verdict. At common law the judgment always
followed the verdict unless the record itself disclosed that a con-
trary judgment was required as a matter of law. If the verdict
was wrong as a matter of law on the evidence rather than on the
pleadings, the only remedy was a new trial. Various states enacted
statutes to remedy this defect. One of these was adopted in
Pennsylvania which read as follows:
"That whenever, upon the trial of any issue, a point requesting
binding instructions has been reserved or declined, the party pre-
senting the point may, within the time prescribed for moving for
a new trial, or within such other or further time as the court shall
allow, move the court to have all the evidence taken upon the trial
duly certified and filed so as to become part of the record, and forjudgment non obstante veredicto upon the whole record; where-
upon it shall be the duty of the court, if it does not grant a new
trial, to so certify the evidence, and to enter such judgment as
should have been entered upon that evidence, at the same time
granting to the party against whom the decision is rendered an
exception to the action of the court in that regard. From the
judgment thus entered either party may appeal to the Supreme
95F. R. C. P. 50 (b) ; Bachnor v. Eickhoff (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 29, 1939.
not yet reported).9o(1913) 228 U. S. 364, 33 Sup. Ct. 523, 57 L. Ed. 879.
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Court, as in other cases, which shall review the action of the
court below, and enter such judgment as shall be warranted by
the evidence taken in that court. 9 7
This statute was applied by the circuit court of appeals in the
Slocum Case under the Conformity Act. The circuit court of
appeals reversed a judgment entered on a verdict of a jury, and
directed judgment for the other party as permitted by the statute
just quoted. The Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Van Devanter,
stated that the real question involved was whether in this direc-
tion by the circuit court of appeals there was an infraction of the
seventh amendment to the constitution, and in a five to four deci-
sion (Mr. justice Hughes writing the dissenting opinion) held
that there had been an interference with that right, and accordingly
modified the judgment of the circuit court of appeals by eliminat-
ing the direction to enter judgment for the defendant notwith-
standing the verdict and by substituting a direction for a new
trial. The theory expounded by the Supreme Court was that
when the court rejects the jury's findings of fact it reopens the
issues of fact, and if it enters a judgment contrary to that of the
jury, by itself determining those issues, it contravenes the provi-
sions of the seventh amendment. This case was with reason
severely criticized."" The federal courts found ways to escape
the effect of this decision by falling back on the common law
method of reservation by the court of decision of a question of law
until the jury had rendered its verdictf 9
Then came the case of Northern Ry. Co. v. Page,100 where
the Supreme Court approved without discussion the action of the
district court of Massachusetts in directing the jury that in case
it found for one party it also bring in an alternative finding for
the other-a procedure permitted by the Massachusetts state prac-
tice which permitted such an alternative finding to be used in the
event that the court was of the opinion that as a matter of law the
party in whose favor the primary finding was made was not
entitled to recover. The district court had entered judgment in
favor of the defendant on the alternative verdict on the ground
that there was no evidence to support the primary finding in
favor of the plaintiff. The circuit court of appeals had reversed
07Pennsylvania Laws 1905, p. 286, ch. 198.
98For a bibliography, see Dobie, Cases on Federal Procedure (1935)
439; generally, see Clark and Moore, A New Federal Procedure: I, The
Background, (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 387.
90Note, (1935) 45 Yale L. J. 166.
100(1927) 274 U. S. 65, 47 Sup. Ct. 491, 71 L. Ed. 929.
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the district court and had directed the district court to enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Upon the facts in this case it
can properly be said that where a jury returns alternative verdicts,
the consent of the jury was obtained by the court for directing
judgment non obstante veredicto and that therefore the Supreme
Court was only recognizing the old common law procedure of
obtaining jury consent in such circumstances.
The third case is Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman,"'0
in which the practice allowed by a New York statute02 was ap-
proved. The facts were as follows: At the close of the evidence
the defendant moved for a directed verdict in its favor on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff. The court reserved decision, submitted
the case to the jury subject to its opinion on the questions reserved,
and received from the jury a verdict for the plaintiff. No objection
was made to the reservation or to this mode of procedure. There-
after the court held that the evidence was sufficient and entered
judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict. An appeal was taken to
the circuit court of appeals, which held the evidence insufficient
and reversed the judgment with a direction for a new trial. The
defendant urged that the direction should be for a dismissal of
the complaint, but the circuit court of appeals held that under the
Slocum Case the direction had to be for a new trial. The Supreme
Court, having granted certiorari, held by Mr. Justice Van De-
vanter that, in reversing because as a matter of law the evidence
was insufficient to sustain the verdict, the judgment of the circuit
court of appeals should embody a direction for a judgment of
dismissal on the merits, and not for a new trial, and that such
judgment of dismissal would be the equivalent of a judgment for
the defendant on a verdict directed in its favor.
The Supreme Court distinguished the Slocum Case on the
ground that there the defendant's request for a directed verdict
was denied without reservation of the question of the sufficiency
of the evidence or of any other matter and that the verdict for the
plaintiff was taken unconditionally, and not subject to the court's
opinion on the sufficiency of the evidence, while in the present case
the trial court expressly reserved its ruling on defendant's motion,
the verdict for the plaintiff was taken pending the court's rulings
on the motion and subject to those rulings, and no objection was
made to the reservation or to this mode of procedure. The court
101(1935) 295 U. S. 654, 55 Sup. Ct. 890, 79 L. Ed. 1636.
102N. Y. C. P. A. sec. 461.
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accordingly stated that the parties must be regarded as having
tacitly acceded to them. The main basis of this decision, it seems,
was that at common law there was an established practice of re-
serving law questions arising in trials by jury and of taking ver-
dicts subject to the ultimate ruling on the questions reserved
"and under this practice the reservation carried with it authority
to make such ultimate disposition of the case as might be made
essential by the ruling under the reservation, such as non-suiting
the plaintiff where he had obtained a verdict, entering a verdict
or judgment for one party where the jury had given a verdict
to the other or making other essential adjustments."
If the court had rested its opinion solely on this ground, it is
submitted that there would have been little doubt of the propriety
of such procedure. The court, however, also emphasized the fact
that the plaintiff's counsel made no objection to the reservation of
the court and, therefore, it might be contended that if the plaintiff
had made a timely objection the holding would have been different.
The weight of authority seems to be that the consent of the parties
is not necessary to reserving a question of law, but the doubt re-
mained.
In view of these decisions the Advisory Committee in present-
ing the new rules raised the question whether the practice of
rendering judgment on the evidence contrary to the verdict should
be sustained regardless of whether the jury or the parties, or
both, consented thereto. As Rule 49(b) clearly shows, the
Supreme Court has answered that the court may submit a case
subject to a later decision on questions of law without the consent
of either the jury or the parties and thus the old problems have
been eradicated.
FINDINGS OF FACT IN IssuEs TRIED BY THE COURT
The federal rules provide that "in all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the
entry of the appropriate judgment. ' 10 3 As stated, this rule ap-
plies not only to causes formerly placed in the equity category
but also to cases formerly denominated law cases tried without a
jury 04-- the jury having been waived, by failure to demand one' 0 5
lOaF. R. C. P. 52(a).
'
0 4That this was the intent of the committee, see Note to the Supreme
Court following proposed rule 59, Report of the Advisory Committee
(1937). 148.
105F. R. C. P. 38(d), 39(b).
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or by express stipulation,° 6-- or where the court finds that there
is no constitutional right to a jury, although demanded. 10 7
It has been stated that under the Rules the distinction is be-
tween jury and non-jury actions instead of between law and
equity;1" it would seem more accurate to say that the new dis-
tinction is between jury and non-jury issues rather than actions ;109
for if the word "action" in Rule 52(a) is construed literally, the
situation will then arise that there will be no findings of fact
on some material issues in actions where as to particular issues
a jury trial has been demanded. This result would be incon-
sistent with one of the purposes of Rule 52, for in those cases
what constituted the grounds" ° of the trial court's judgment would
not be readily apparent to the appellate courts. This inconsistency
is emphasized by the analogous situation with regard to special
verdicts where the trial court is directed to make findings of fact
on material issues that inadvertently are not submitted to the
jury.11' Hence, Rule 52 should be construed to require findings
on the court tried issues even though part of the issues in an action
are tried to a jury. 112
2O0F. C. R. P. 39(a).
107F. R. C. P. 39(a).
1083 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 3118; Sunderland, The New
Federal Rules, (1938) 45 W. Va. L. Q. 5.
'O9Although F. R. C. P. 52(a) provides that "In all actions tried upon
the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts," yet Rules 38 and 39
(regulating the form of trial) speak primarily of issues and expressly con-
template that in a single action some issues may be tried by a jury while
the others are tried by the court. See especially Rule 39(b) ("Issues not
demanded for trial by jury . . . shall be tried by the court") (italics
added).
"OF. R. C. P. 52(a) ("the court shall similarly set forth the findings
of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action")
(italics added).
11"F. R. C. P. 49(a); although this subdivision says that "the court
may make a finding," it would seem that the word "may" in this con-
nection means that the court has been given a power which it had not
previously possessed, and that if the omission is pointed out to the court
before judgment or not later than 10 days after entry of judgment,
(52(b); cf. 59 (a)) it is under a duty to make such a finding if it is
necessary to the judgment; that the trial court's failure to make such
findings ordinarily will not be a defect in the judgment, see p. 8 supra.
"12Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Proceedings of Institutes (New
York 1938) at 331. That the word "action" shall be construed as a synonym
for "issue" does not indicate that its obvious meaning is without significance.
The Judicial Code authorizes appeals as of right to the circuit courts of
appeal from all final judgments of the district courts, 28 U. S. C. sec. 225(a),
but in the case of interlocutory orders, which are obtained on motion in an -
action rather than as the result of the trial of an action, this absolute right to
appeal is limited to orders denying or granting certain types of extraordinary
relief (interlocutory orders concerning injunctions and receiverships and in-
terlocutory decrees in admiralty) 28 U. S. C. sec. 227. The Federal Rules
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This duty of making special findings of fact is mandatory,
not discretionary. 13 Failure to make findings was a sufficient
ground, in equity, to remand a case with direction for the trial
court to comply with Equity Rule 7012.114 However, the failure
to make a particular finding of fact ordinarily should not make
the judgment defective, for to do so would revive and make
applicable to actions tried by a court the technical requirements
which, so far as special verdicts are concerned, have been abol-
ished by Rule 49(a). 11' In this connection, a reaffirmation of the
modern equitable principle, that the purpose of findings of fact is
to enable appellate courts to ascertain the basis for the determina-
tion below and that where the appellate court can readily under-
stand the questions presented, precise findings are not absolutely
essential on all material issues," 6 may be a helpful guide in cases
which do not fully comply with Rule 52. Since the district courts
have no discretion as to whether or not they should make findings,
it would seem to follow that where issues are submitted to an
advisory jury 7 the trial court must either adopt the jury's find-
ings or make its own," 8 and "state separately its conclusions of
law." 
9
The new rules have eliminated several formalities which fre-
quently prevented the presentation of certain questions on appeal.
do not apply to admiralty proceedings, F. R. C. P. 81(a) (1). Of these
forms of relief Rule 52 expressly applies to only one class-orders "grant-
ing or refusing interlocutory injunctions." Thus it seems that findings of
fact are not essential prerequisites in taking an appeal from an interlocutory
judgment on the subject matter of receivership.
"iaThis follows from the terms of Rule 52 that special findings shall
be made "In all actions . . . tried without a jury" (italics added).
1141nterstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, (1938) 304 U. S. 55, 58
Sup. Ct. 768, 82 L. Ed. 1146; Oil Shares, Inc. v. Commercial Trust
Company, (1938) 304 U. S. 551, 58 Sup. Ct. 1359, 82 L. Ed. 1522, for
the facts of this case see the opinion of the court below, sub nom., Oil
Shares v. Kahn, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1938) 94 F. (2d) 751; Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. City of San Antonio, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1935) 75 F.
(2d) 880, cert. denied, (1935) 295 U. S. 754, 55 Sup. Ct. 835, 79 L. Ed.
1698.
"15Supra, p. 8; cf. Sunderland, Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law in Cases Where Juries are Waived, (1937) 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 218,
226 ("it [special finding in a jury-waived case] is held to serve the same
purpose, and to be judged by the same standards, as a special verdict").
16Cf. Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (1938) 69 App. D. C. 233,
10 F. (2d) 98; Shellman v. Shellman, (1938) 68 App. D. C. 197, 95 F.
(2d) 108; Toledo, P. & W. R. R. v. Peoria & P. Union Ry. Co,
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 745.
"1F. R. C. P. 39(c).
1183 Moore, Federal Practice (1938), at p. 3119, n. 1; that the verdict
of an advisory jury is not binding on the court, see Watt v. Starks, (1879)
101 U. S. 247, 252, 25 L Ed. 826.
119F. R. C. P. 52 (a).
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Now, in order to question the sufficiency of the evidence it is not
essential that appellant shall have raised that question in the trial
court.12 0 The provision that "Requests for findings are not neces-
sary for purposes of review"12' has been interpreted as abolishing
a formal restriction that otherwise would bar review of the ques-
tion whether there was evidence to support the findings of fact.
22
However, it seems more probable that the dispensation with re-
spect to requests for findings was intended to permit a party to
assert on appeal that there was an error of law by the trial court-
i.e., that the facts as found do not support the judgment 2 -- with-
out complying with the old rule in jury-waived cases. Under the
former federal practice if an action at law was tried without a jury,
it was left to the discretion of the court whether the findings of
fact should be general or special ;123a if the court only made a
general finding, the appellate court would not review the question
of law whether the facts supported the judgment. 24  That ques-
tion of law would be considered only if appellant presented proposi-
tions of law to the trial court for it to rule on or succeeded in, hav-
ing the trial court make special findings of fact.125  While the
insertion of this provision in Rule 52(a) was a wise precaution, it
does not seem necessary because the trial court must always make
special findings of fact on issues tried by it without a jury, a
general finding being insufficient. However, the provision may
have an unexpected utility in avoiding incorporation of the New
120F. R. C. P. 52(b) ("the question of the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party
raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such
findings or has made a motion to amend them or a motion for judgment").
121F. R. C. P. 52(a).22Federal Rules of Civil Procedure & Proceedings of Amer. Bar Ass'n
Institute, Cleveland (1938), 317; 3 Moore. Federal Practice (1938) 3120.12 See Jackson County v. Alton R. Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1939) 105 F.
(2d) 633, 638.
123028 U.S.C. sec. 773 ("The finding of the court upon the facts, which
may be either general or special, shall have the same effect as the verdict
of a jury").
'-
4British Queen Mining Company v. Baker Silver Mining Company,
(1891) 139 U. S. 222, 11 Sup. Ct. 523, 35 L. Ed. 147.25See Norris v. Jackson, (1869) 76 U. S. 125, 128, 19 L. Ed. 608
("if the parties desire a review of the law involved in the case, they must
either get the court to find a special verdict [special findings], which raises
the legal propositions, or they must present to the court their propositions
of law, and require the court to rule on them"); Law v. United States,(1925) 266 U. S. 494, 496, 45 Sup. Ct. 175, 69 L. Ed. 401. Even though
the trial court refused to pass upon the propositions of law, the question
was effectively raised and if counsel duly excepted to the judge's refusal
the appellate court would review the question of law whether the facts as
found supported the judgment. See Seep v. Ferris-I-aggarty Copper Min-
ing Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1912) 201 Fed. 893, 896.
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York state doctrine that the only way to raise the question on
appeal that certain facts have been conclusively proved is to sub-
mit requests for findings to the trial court,"26 and therefore a
motion for judgment on the specific ground that certain facts are
conclusively proved should be sufficient to preserve the question.
1 7
Of vital significance to appellate practice, in actions tried
without a jury, is the meaning of the word "facts" in Rule 52(a).
Prior to the adoption of the Rules by the Supreme Court,'12 8 the
federal decisions were in accord in stating or assuming that a
special finding of fact should be a statement of a material or
ultimate129 fact as distinguished from an ezidentiary fact.2 0
126Thompson v. Bank of British North America, (1880) 82 N. Y. 1;
Cohen, The Powers of The New York Court of Appeals, (1934) 317, but
see Grace v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co., (1939) 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 400,
410, (where the court ordered judgment to be entered on its written and
signed opinion and stated that it was unnecessary to pass upon the proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law because of the provisions of N. Y.
C. P. A. sec. 440) ; see infra note 160.127But see Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Proceedings of Institutes
(Washington 1938) 144.
123Order Re Rules of Procedure, dated Dec. 20, 1937, 302 U. S. 783.
129The federal decisions use "ultimate fact" and "material fact" syno-
nymously, but apparently have preferred the former term. However, the
term "ultimate fact" is not a wholly satisfactory one. It is employed
to characterize that statement of fact which determines a material issue
raised by the pleadings. In this connection, the courts attempt to draw
a distinction betveen ultimate facts and evidentiary facts, the latter being
statements or reports of observation resulting from exercise of the human
sensory powers and treated, from a lawyer's point of view, as not involving
any exercise of the logical powers of the human intellect. The ultimate
fact is supposed to be achieved by inference from a mass of evidentiary
facts. Thus, there is implicit in the word "ultimate" an assumption that
the answer to a material issue is always a statement based upon a line of
inference from reports of human observation. That assumption, however.
is not always true, because while some material issues may be determined
by the statement of an ultimate fact, some may be answered, depending
upon the circumstances, by either ultimate or evidentiary facts and yet other
material issues can only be answered by the statement of an evidentiary
fact. For instance, where the death of a particular person is a material
issue, the question raised may be answered either by the report of a
w'itness that he saw the lifeless body, or by a line of inference from
testimony indicating that the person disappeared under circumstances where
it was highly probable there was no chance of escaping alive (person fall-
ing overboard at sea) and testimony that the person was never seen again.
Then, in an action for slander per se, a .material issue is whether or not
certain words, which the law characterizes as defamatory, were spoken;
this issue can only be determined by the testimony of a witness that he
heard the words spoken. Hence, to avoid the emphasis of the word
"ultimate" (that a line of inference is always involved) and to emphasize
the essential point that a finding of fact or answer in a special verdict
should respond to a material issue raised in the pleadings, it seems de-
sirable to refer to such findings as findings of inaterial facts rather than of
idtimate facts.
130jud. Act (1789) sec. 19, 1 Stat. at L. 83 ("it shall be the duty of
circuit courts, in causes in equity and of admiralty and maritime juris-
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In 1930, the Supreme Court adopted Equity Rule 70 /"'
which provided:
"In deciding suits in equity, including those required to be
heard before three judges, the court of first instance shall find
the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon; . . . Such findings and conclusions shall be entered of
record and if an appeal is taken from the decree, shall be included
by the clerk in the record which was certified to the appellate
court. .. "
Although this rule did not contain an assimilation of special find-
ings of fact to the answers in a special verdict 132 nor specify their
form,133 yet the conclusion does not follow that the Supreme
Court intended that findings of fact should be of a different nature,
since the failure of earlier statutes to provide for the form and
content of findings apparently has never been given any signifi-
diction, to cause the facts on which they found their sentence or decree,
fully to appear upon the record." Sec. 19 was altered in 1803, 2 Stat. at
L. 244, and among various changes the requirements of findings was
omitted); Wiscart v. D'Auchy, (1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 320, 1 L. Ed. 619,
(statement of facts held sufficient though only stating material facts; the
court indicated that doubt as to sufficiency would have been reasonable only
if there had been merely a general finding. (1865) 13 Stat. at L. 501, 28
U. S. C. secs. 773, 875 (findings of fact in jury-waived actions at law):
Norris v. Jackson, (1869) 76 U. S. 125, 19 L. Ed. 608; Anglo-American
Land M. & A. Co. v. Lombard, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1904) 68 C. C. A. 89, 132
Fed. 721, cert. denied (1904) 196 U. S. 638, 25 Sup. Ct. 793, 49 L. Ed.
630; Packer v. Whittier, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1899) 91 Fed. 511, cert. denied(1899) 174 U S. 802, 19 Sup. Ct. 887, 43 L. Ed. 1187. Supreme Court
Rule 41(1), (2), (3), (4) (findings of fact in suits before Court of Claims,
first adopted in 1865; for the language of this rule at various times see
(1865) 3 Wall. (U.S.) VII; (1873) 17 Wall. (U.S.) XVII (term "ulti-
mate facts" omitted) ; (1925) 266 U. S. 683; (1928) 275 U. S. 627; (1932)
286 U. S. 627; (1939) 306 U. S. Appendix: United States v. Clark, (1876)
94 U. S. 73 24 L. Ed. 67; see United States v. Anciens Etablissements,
(1912) 224 U. S. 309, 329, 32 Sup. Ct. 479, 56 L. Ed. 778. (1875) 18 Stat.
at L. 315 (findings of facts in admiralty): See Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Ocean Ins. Co., (1882) 107 U. S. 485, 501, 1 Sup. Ct. 582, 27 L. Ed. 337;
the provisions of this statute became inoperative by virtue of Circuit Court
of Appeals Act, (1891) 26 Stat. at L. 826, see Frankfurter and Landis, The
Business of Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, (1930) 44 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 30, 31 and notes.
The above cited statutes and court rules were more than mere ex-
pressions of a desire for procedural refinement; they resulted from bitter
political and intra-professional disputes. For an excellent exposition of
this historical controversy, see Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of
Fact, (1937) 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190.
131(1930) 281 U. S. 773, amended (1935) 296 U. S. 671.
132Cf. (1865) 13 Stat. at L. 501 (in jury-waived cases, the "finding
of the court upon the facts, which may be either general or special, shall
have the same effect as the verdict of a jury") ; (1865) 3 Wall. (U.S.) VII(the Court of Claims shall make findings "in the nature of a special
verdict").
133Cf. (1865) 3 Wall. (U.S.) VII (the Court of Claims shall make
findings of "the ultimate facts . . . and not the evidence on which these
ultimate facts are founded").
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cance.134 While knowledge of the court's intent in the phrasing
of Rule 70 is not available, the more plausible rationalization for
the omission of the analogy to a special verdict is that the court
wanted to avoid the harsh technicalities connected with a special
verdict. Undoubtedly, an additional reason was the influence of
the historical concept that the equity form of review was a re-
examination of the entire case. 35 However, the circuit courts
of appeal have been somewhat vague in their treatment of Equity
Rule 70 , though it has been held that the findings should be of
material facts.3 6
The Supreme Court has had the matter of the findings under
Equity Rule 70 before it on several occasions in the past years
but has not been completely in accord as to the form of the find-
ings. Thus, in Tax Commissioner v. Jackson,13 7 we find the
following statement:
"The district court failed to make findings of fact and law
as are now required by Equity Rule 70 , but contented itself with
a partial summary of the facts and certain general conclusions of
law. Had the rule been in force at the time of the trial, we should
feel constrained to remand the case with directions to make such
findings."'138
In a case involving a temporary injunction, decided before Equity
Rule 70 required findings of fact and conclusions of law in
such a situation the court said :139
"While an application for an interlocutory injunction does
not involve a final determination of the merits, it does involve the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion. . . . The result of the
court's inquiry into the issues and into the facts presented upon the
interlocutory application, . . . should be set forth by the court in
a statement-of the facts and law constituting the grounds of its
decision."140
.34Wiscart v. D'Auchy, (1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 320, 1 L. Ed. 619;
United States v. Clark, (1876) 94 U. S. 73, 24 L. Ed. 67.
1'5Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, (1937) 4 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 190.
1360il Shares, Inc. v. Kahn, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1938) 94 F. (2d) 751
cert. granted and case remanded with directions to make findings of fact,
sub. nom. Oil Shares, Inc. v. Commercial Trust Company, (1938) 304
,U. S. 551, 58 Sup. Ct. 1059, 82 L. Ed. 1522; Boss v. Hardee, (1937) 68
App. D. C. 75, 93 F. (2d) 234; see Shellman v. Shellman, (1938) 68 App.
D. C. 197, 95 F. (2d) 108; but compare the attitude of uncertainty as to
the form of findings manifested in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
City of San Antonio. (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 880, and in Brown
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (1938) 69 App. D. C. 233, 100 F. (2d) 98.
'37(1931) 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540, 75 L. Ed. 1248.
18BAt p. 533.
'
39Public Serv. Com'r v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., (1933) 289 U. S. 67, 53
Sup. Ct. 514, 77 L. Ed. 1036.
14°At p. 70.
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Again, in a rate confiscation case 41 the majority opinion seems
to have been satisfied with the findings but the dissenting opinion
says :U2
"The lower court's decree and opinion taken together may not
reasonably be construed to comply with Equity Rule 70/. In
confiscation cases, the rule should be strictly enforced. The trial
court should make a definite and complete statement of the facts
on which it rests its judgment. . . . [On] June 2, 1930, we
promulgated the rule, [quoting Equity Rule 70 ] .... The com-
mand that the trial couit 'shall find the facts specially' means at
least that the statement shall be definite, concise and complete as
distinguished from discursive, argumentative, obscure or frag-
mentary .... The direction 'and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon' shows that discussion of facts and law in the
course of explanation, reasoning or opinion to clarify or support
the conclusion or judgment reached, is not sufficient. . . . The
rule was intended to make unnecessary, analysis or extended
examination for the ascertainment of the facts and propositions
of law on which rest decrees of the courts of first instance. The
opinion of the majority does not purport to 'find the facts spe-
cially' or to 'state separately its conclusions of law thereon.' ...
Public Service Conm'n v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., . . .143 decided after
the argument of this case, is of special interest. The commission
appealed from an interlocutory decree declaring that enforcement
of telephone rates prescribed by the commission would result in
confiscation of the company's property. The district court filed
no opinion and made no special findings of fact. The company
moved to affirm. The commission's contention was that the
decree should be reversed for lack of specification 6f the facts on
which it rested. The company maintained that the decree was
abundantly sustained by the facts shown in the record. We held
that Rule 70 does not apply to decisions on applications for
temporary injunctions and made it clear that the duty of the
court in passing on such applications was not altered by the adop-
tion of the rule.... And we refused, even when aided by adequate
brief and argument of counsel, to consider whether the tem-
porary injunction was warranted by the facts shown in the record.
We vacated the decree ...and remanded the case for findings
and conclusions appropriate to a decision upon the application
for an interlocutory injunction. And it is the purpose of this
court to promulgate a rule definitely requiring district courts to
"J144make special findings of fact in such cases. ...
'-Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, (1933) 289 U. S. 287,
53 Sup. Ct. 637, 77 L. Ed. 1180.142The dissenting opinion was written by Butler, J., and concurred in
by Sutherland, J.
14s(1933) 289 U. S. 67, 53 Sup. Ct. 514, 77 L. Ed. 1036.
'"4Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, (1933) 289 U. S. 237,
327 et seq., 53 Sup. Ct. 637, 77 L. Ed. 1180.
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Where a decree of a three judge court dismissed a suit to
enjoin enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission the majority opinion said:
"This court will not search the record to ascertain whether, by
use of what there may be found, general and ambiguous state-
ments in the report intended to serve as findings may by construc-
tion be given a meaning sufficiently definite to constitute a valid
basis for the order. In the absence of a finding of essential basic
facts, the order cannot be sustained. 1 14 5
Mr. Justice Stone in a dissent, after stating the facts which he
felt had been found, said:
"These findings are thus the complete and obvious equivalent
of a finding. . . . They are ample to raise the question of law
decided below and presented here .... "I
In 1938, a direct appeal to the United States in a suit in
equity to enjoin an alleged conspiracy between distributors and
exhibitors of motion pictures in restraint of interstate commerce
was remanded by the Supreme Court to the district court for fur-
ther findings.' 4  The decree of the district court in this case, 148
apart from the recital of the proceedings and the terms of the
judgment, contained four paragraphs. The first three paragraphs
stated in substance that the defendant distributors, by including
at the request of the defendant exhibitors, provisions in license
agreements with subsequent run exhibitors fixing admission prices
and prohibiting double feature programs "have engaged in a
combination, conspiracy and agreement with said" defendant ex-
hibitors "to restrain trade and commerce in said motion picture
films, in violation of an act of Congress." The fourth paragraph
stated that the provisions as to minimum admission prices and
the prohibition of double featuring were "illegal and void." These
statements in the decree would seem to be only conclusions of
law. There was an opinion by the district court 49 but no other
findings were made. The Supreme Court in remanding the case
to the district court held that the district court had not complied
with Equity Rule 701/2 and said:
'45Atchison Ry. v. United States, (1935) 295 U. S. 193, 201, 55 Sup.
Ct. 748, 752, 79 L. Ed. 1382. Although this decision does not interpret
Equity Rule 705A, it does present the same problem.
14 GAt p. 202.
1471nterstate Circuit. Inc. v. United States, (1938) 304 U. S. 55, 58
Sup. Ct. 768, 82 L. Ed. 1146.
'48Record on Appeal (Interstate Circuit v. United States, (1939) 306
U. S. 208, 59 Sup. Ct. 467.
140United States v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., (N.D. Tex. 1937) 20 F.
Supp. 868.
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"The court made no formal findings. The court did not find
the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law as
the rule required. The statements in the decree that in making the
restrictive agreements the parties had engaged in an illegal con-
spiracy were but ultimate conclusions and did not dispense with
the necessity of properly formulating the underlying findings of
fact. The opinion of the court was not a substitute for the re-
quired findings. A discussion of portions of the evidence and the
court's reasoning in its opinion do not constitute the special and
formal findings by which it is the duty of the court appropriately
and specifically to determine all the issues which the case presents.
This is an essential aid to the appellate court in reviewing an
equity case . . . and compliance with the rule is particularly im-
portant in an anti-trust case which comes to this court by direct
appeal from the trial court."1 0
Justices Stone and Black stated that they thought that the findings
in the opinion and decree below
"while informal, are sufficient for purposes of decision, and that
the case should therefore be decided now without further proceed-
ings below; the more so because of the public interest involved."''
When the case again reached the Supreme Court' 52 we find
the majority through Mr. Justice Stone, stating as follows:
"The case is now before us on findings of the District Court
specifically stating that appellants did in fact agree with each
other to enter into and carry out the contracts, which the court
found to result in unreasonable and therefore unlawful restraints
of interstate commerce."'1 3
The dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Roberts, states as
follows:
"The district court made ten findings (numbered from 12 to
21, inclusive) of subsidiary or evidentiary facts and based upon
these specific findings one conclusion of ultimate fact,-that the
distributor defendants conspired amongst themselves to take uni-
form action upon the proposals of Interstate and conspired with
each other and with Interstate to impose the restrictions requested
by Interstate upon all subsequent run exhibitors in Dallas, Fort
Worth, Houston and San Antonio. The appellants contend, and
I think their contention is sound, that the subsidiary findings are
insufficient to support the fact conclusion and that these sub-
sidiary findings are, in a number of vital instances, contrary to,
or unsupported by, the agreed statement of facts and, in other
"rOInterstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, (1938) 304 U. S. 55, 58
Sup. Ct. 768, 82 L. Ed. 1146.
"5'Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, (1938) 304 U. S. 55, 58
Sup. Ct. 768, 82 L. Ed. 1146.
"5Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, (1939) 306 U. S. 208, 59
Sup. Ct. 467.
"'At p. 213.
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instances, are in the teeth of uncontradicted and unimpeached
testimony."'15 4
After the Interstate Circuit Case was remanded, the Supreme
Court received a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment in Oil Shares, Inc. v. Kahn.15 5  This was a suit in
equity to have plaintiff's directors and the Commercial Trust
Company declared trustees ex malificio of plaintiff's assets on
the ground that the directors had conspired to get control of and
loot the plaintiff of its assets and that the trust company had
participated in the conspiracy. The findings of the district court
were found solely in its opinion to the effect that a conspiracy
had existed but that the trust company had not been a party to
it.' The circuit court of appeals had held that there had been
a compliance with Equity Rule 70/2. The Supreme Court with-
out opinion granted the writ of certiorari, but remanded the case
to the district court for it to set forth its findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. 5 7 It would seem that the finding that the trust
company was not a party to the conspiracy was a finding of a
material fact. The finding that a conspiracy had existed may
well be termed a conclusion of law. Again, the findings of the
district court were not contained in a document separate and dis-
tinct from the opinion and decree of the district court. Both the
petitioner and respondent considered that the main question was
whether the findings should be of the evidentiary or of the mate-
rial facts. 58 An examination of the new findings made by the
district court shows that counsel and the district court prepared
and adopted findings which contained in addition to material or
ultimate facts a considerable number of what should properly be
termed evidentiary facts.'5 9
Although the decisions above mentioned raise some doubt
it would seem that a proper interpretation of these holdings is
'54At p. 233. Note that Roberts, J., apparently uses the expressions
"subsidiary or evidentiary facts" and "conclusions of ultimate fact" as
synonyms for "material or ultimate facts" and "conclusions of law," re-
spectively. To maintain uniformity of phraseology, it seems preferable to
use only the latter expressions, which have been more generally employed
by the federal courts, particularly in view of the terms in F. R. C. P.
52, supra, p. 20.
'55Oil Shares v. Kahn, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1938) 94 F. (2d) 751.
'5GAt p. 752; see also Record on Appeal, Vol. 1, p. 624.
'157Oil Shares, Inc. v. Commercial Trust Company, (1938) 304 U. S.
551, 58 Sup. Ct. 1059, 82 L. Ed. 1522.
'5sPetitioner's Brief in support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Point III, at p. 26; Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Application for
Writ of Certiorari, at pp. 16, 17. The argument before the circuit court
of appeals was to the same effect, Brief for Appellee at p. 68.
'
5DRecord on Appeal, vol. 3, pp. 983-1018.
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that the findings and conclusions of law should (1) cover all the
material issues in the case, (2) not be sought for in an extended
opinion written by the trial judge, and (3) be of the material facts
and not of the evidentiary facts.". 9a In both the original Interstate
Case and the Oil Shares Case the findings were only found in the
opinion of the district court, and the findings, such as they were,
were in part of ultimate facts; but they were incomplete to the
extent that they did not cover all the material issues in the case.
The mere fact, however, that findings and conclusions are found
solely in the opinion of the trial court should not of itself justify
the remanding of the case.160 The better practice, however, to be
followed, it is submitted, is to prepare a separate document in
which will be found all the material facts plus the conclusions of
law of the court thereon. In this way an appellate court is not
compelled to search through an opinion in its endeavor to discover
(1) the material facts found by the trial court and (2) whether
all the material facts have been found. Furthermore, the appel-
late courts will then be free to devote a greater share of their
time to the important task of considering the questions of law
which the material facts involve and to limit the necessity of read-
15oaPartridge v. Ainley, (S.D. N.Y. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 472.
'GoSee Brusselback v. Cago Corporation, (S.D. N. Y. 1938) 24 F.
Supp. 524, 528, where the Interstate decision is cited as indicating that a
judge's opinion, in and of itself, is an insufficient compliance with Equity
Rule 70%, and that there must be a separate and formal statement of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law apart from the judge's opinion. The
language of the Supreme Court in the Interstate Case, it is submitted, does
not demand this conclusion, in view of the language of the Supreme Court
see supra p. 29. It would seem that the Supreme Court found fault
merely with the fact that the district court's opinion failed to contain find-
ings upon all the material issues and not because the opinion was the docu-
ment in which the findings were made. The court which decided the
Brusselback Case continues to require findings and conclusions distinct from
the judge's opinion, but now only Rule 52 is cited as requiring that practice,
see Partridge v. Ainley, (S.D. N.Y., 1939) 28 F. Supp. 472, 474. In the
district of Massachusetts, the judge's opinion has been considered a suffi-
cient compliance with Rule 52. Proctor v. White, (D. Mass., 1939) 28 F.
Supp. 161. In the state of New York, the decision of the court, in a case
tried to the court without a jury, may be either oral or written and must
set forth the essential facts, N.Y. C.P.A. sec. 440, and in the second judicial
district of New York the trial justices of the supreme court (the trial court
of general jurisdiction) have adopted an express rule that if decision is
reserved, the court has discretion to make either a formal decision containing
findings of fact and conclusions of law or a written and signed opinion, cf.
Grace v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co., (1939) 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 400, 410.
Although no express rule has been adopted, the practice is the same in
first judicial district of New York. For the history of the New York law on
findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Report of the Judicial Council of
the State of New York (1936) 201 et seq.
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ing the evidence in the case to those portions the adequacy of
which to support the material facts are actually in question.'61
Under the previous practice it was generally stated: that, in
actions at law, review of the facts was limited to the inquiry as to
whether they were supported by any substantial evidence ;1612 that
in an equity appeal, the entire record was open to reexamination
on the facts and the law.163 While this distinction arose because
the appeal in equity, as distinguished from the writ of error at
law, was a process of civil law origin,6 4 yet it was justified dur-
ing most of the period when there was a separate equity system
in the federal courts because the evidence before the trial judge in
equity was mostly documentary6 5 and the opportunity of the
appellate court accurately to weigh the evidence was equal to that
of the trial judge since the behavior of witnesses was not involved.
This justification disappeared in 1912 with the restoration of the
requirement of proof by oral testimony. 6  From then on the trial
courts on the equity side also have had the advantage of being able
to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. The appellate courts
then developed self-denying rules of review in equity causes limit-
ing the scope of their re-examination of the facts (findings of
fact will stand in the appellate court unless clearly erroneous;
findings of fact made on conflicting evidence are presumptively
correct unless obvious error has intervened in the application of
the law to the facts) which have had the effect of making reversals
for errors of fact rare.
1 67
Thus the appellate courts in reviewing equity causes were
becoming influenced to a greater extent by the principles govern-
ing appeals in cases at law, and as it has been persuasively con-
tended, the appellate courts in actions at law have shown a tendency
to review the facts in examining the sufficiency of the facts to sus-
tain the judgment. 68
161Frankfurter and Landis. The Business of the Supreme Court (1927)
291.
162Supra notes 79, 80. McCaughn v. Real Estate Co., (1936) 297 U. S.
606, 56 Sup. Ct. 604, 80 L. Ed. 879 (jury waived action at law).
'
63Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, (1937) 4 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 190; Ilsen, The Preliminary Draft of Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, (1937) 11 St. John's L. Rev. 212, 257.
164See Wiscart v. D'Auchy, (1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 320, 327, 1 L. Ed.
619.
1652 Stat. at L. 156, 166. Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of
Fact, (1937) 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190, 204; Ilsen, The Preliminary Draft of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (1937) 11 St. John's L. Rev. 212, 257.
'
66Equity Rule 46.
le7For a full discussion of this development see Clark and Stone,
Review of Findings of Fact, (1937) 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190, 207-209.
168Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, (1937) 4 U. Chi. L.
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Despite this apparent judicial trend the distinction in formulae
(at law, no reversal unless there is no substantial evidence; 169
in equity, no reversal unless the finding is against the clear weight
of evidence) 70 still weighs heavily. Thus, although it may take
as obvious an error in equity as at law to move the court, yet
the tendency in equity has been to incorporate the whole transcript
of evidence in narrative form into the record on appeal for the
appellate court to reviewY.7 1  Though statistics are unavailable,
it is believed that appeals in equity and admiralty were propor-
tionately more numerous than in actions at law because of the
hope of obtaining reversals on the factsY.
7 2
The Advisory Committee was in disagreement as to the limita-
tion of review to be provided for issues tried by the court without
a jury. Dean Clark (now Circuit Judge in second circuit) advo-
cated the extension of the law type of review to court findings
of fact, 13 but a majority of the committee favored extension of
the equity review to all issues tried by the court.717 Instead of
submitting alternative rules and permitting the Supreme Court
to make its own choice as was done in other instances,'17  the
equity formula--"The findings of the court in such cases shall
have the same effect as that heretofore given to findings in
suits in equity"-was advocated.17 6  In transmitting the first
Rev. 190, at 210; cf. the following equity cases: Lawson v. United States
Mining Co., (1907) 207 U. S. 1, 12, 28 Sup. Ct. 15, 19, 52 L. Ed. 65("It is our duty to accept a finding of fact, unless clearly and manifestly
wrong"); Malloy v. New York Life Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1939) 103
F. (2d) 439; Brislin v. Killanna Holding Corporation, (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1936) 85 F. (2d) 667, 669; Johnson v. Umsted, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1933) 64
F. (2d) 316, 318; Coats v. Barton, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 25 F. (2d)
813, 815; United States v. Grass Creek Oil & Gas Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1916) 236 Fed. 481, 484.
'
0 5 Supra, notes 78, 79.170Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, (1937) 4 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 190, 207-209; note 168, supra.
17'Cf. Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Silver King C. M. Co.(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1913) 204 Fed. 166, 177 ("The Court below was com-
pelled to ascertain the amount and value of this ore from more than 4,000
printed pages of evidence. . . . Each of the findings of fact . . . is
vigorously assailed . . . in oral argument and in briefs which contain
many hundreds of printed pages. Each of them has been carefully ex-
amined . . . and in the light of the evidence to which they refer, and
has been found to have been deduced from conflicting testimony.")
172Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 533, 540.
173Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, (1937) 4 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 190, 191-192.1T4Note to the Supreme Court following Proposed Rule 68, Pre-
liminary Draft (1936).
1
7 5 See Proposed Rules 3, 6(6), 56, 74, 85, 92, Preliminary Draft
(1936).
'
76Proposed Rule 68, Preliminary Draft (1936).
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published draft of the rules to the Supreme Court, the chair-
man of the committee stated that it was obvious that the law type
of review must be rejected.1 7 7  Its rejection was not treated as
obvious in the Note to the Supreme Court following Proposed
Rule 68. The rule was changed in the second published draft ;17
the language of the second draft so far as it pertains to the scope
of review of facts is the same as that in Rule 52, as adopted by
the Supreme Court, which provides:
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless dearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."
It has been assumed that Rule 52 provides for the equity
review, but there is a possibility that the scope of review called
for by this rule may be an open question for the Supreme Court
to settle, for not only has the express equity characterization been
deleted in favor of language which, although found in modern
federal equity cases, 179 would seem to be an accurate statement
of the effect to be given to jury verdicts, 180 but also the Committee
Note1 8' states, not that Rule 52 adopts, but merely that it is in
accord with the modem federal equity practice.1 8 2
177Preliminary Draft (1936), at XIV.
178Proposed Rule 59, Report of the Advisory Committee (1937).
'
79Supra, note 168.
180Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Facts (1937) 4 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 190, 210, note 90.
3laFollowing Rule 52.
'
82But see Guilford Const. Co. v. Biggs, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1939) 102
F. (2d) 46, 47 where Parker, C. J., said: "As to the value of the stock dis-
tributed to the receiver and credited upon the claim of the bank, there is
nothing in the record which would justify our disturbing the findings of
the district judge with regard thereto. The provisions of the new pro-
cedural rules that the findings of fact of the trial judge are to be accepted
on appeal unless clearly wrong (Rule 52(a), 28 U. S. C. A. following
section 723c) is but the formulation of a rule long recognized and applied
by courts of equity. . . ." If Rule 52 is interpreted as codifying the
equity rule as to scope of review, consider the incentive to jockeying for
position in cases which can be brought either in the court of claims or
in the district court under the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. secs. 41 subd. 20,
764); Wessel v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 137
(suit, in nature of action at law, in district court under Tucker Act to
recover income tax payments; the circuit court of appeals held that
review of the special findings of fact, made pursuant to 28 U. S. C. sec.
764, was limited to questions of law; thus, prior to adoption of the Federal
Rules, the scope of review under the Tucker Act was the same whether a
suit was commenced in a district court or in the Court of Claims, United
States v. Wells, (1931) 283 U. S. 102, 51 Sup. Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867;
and as to claims for tax refunds made either in a district court or directly
from the board of tax appeals to the circuit court of appeals (26 U.S.C.
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It has been argued that the real equity review is preferable
because it affords an opportunity not only to correct errors of law
but to do justice on the facts, and the English practice has been
looked to as a worthy model."8 ' However, the English practice
is not an entirely appropriate analogy. The problems of federal
procedure are complicated because of American notions as to the
function of the judiciary. Not only is access to the federal courts
substantially less expensive than in England from the standpoint
of court costs, thus tending to increase the frequency of resort
to litigation, but the potential amount of litigation is greater in
the United States because the scope of judicial activity here extends
not only to private disputes, but there is also thorough super-
vision of administrative agencies and control of executive and
legislative actions under the guise of statutory construction and
constitutional interpretation. To make this extensive judicial
control workable, it is essential that the courts keep reasonably
up to date in their work, and, of course, one of the obvious ways
of ensuring this is to make proper adjustments in procedure. So
far as the approximately three score judges and justices who
render the intermediate and ultimate decisions are concerned, the
scope of review under Rule 52 is the strategic point for adjust-
ment. To the extent that the traditional concepts of law review
are applied under Rule 52, to that extent will their burden be
lightened. It seems particularly desirable that the Supreme Court
be freed from the necessity of analyzing confused and conflicting
testimony and passing upon the weight of evidence. s4  To this
end, it is not beyond expectation that the Supreme Court may
find Rule 52 ambiguous and resolve the question in favor of the
common law rather than the equity formula.
APPEAL PROCEDURE
As an indication of the professed spirit of the rules we find
the abolition of the outmoded summons and severance doctrine of
appellate procedure.'8 ' The Supreme Court of the United States
secs. 617 f. 641, 641 c; 28 U. S. C. sec. 41 (20), Helvering v. Rankins,(1935) 295 U. S. 123, 55 Sup. Ct. 732, 79 L. Ed. 1343).
183Sunderland, The Scope of Judicial Review, (1929) 27 Mich. L.
Rev. 416; see also Blume, Review of Facts in Non-Jury Cases, (1936) 20
J. Am. Jud. Soc. 68.
28 4Frankfurter and Landis, The Judiciary Act of 1925, (1928) 42 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 23.
'
8 rF. R. C. P. 74; cf. Masterson v. Herndon, (1870) 10 Wall. (U.S.)
416, 19 L. Ed. 953; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Bunn, (1932)
285 U. S. 169, 52 Sup. Ct. 354, 76 L. Ed. 685, and the recent circuit court
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by its new rules has also expressly discarded this ancient rule.185
Furthermore, in like tenor there is an important provision that
no judgment or order shall be vacated, modified or otherwise
disturbed unless an error has been committed going to the funda-
mental rights of the parties."'
A recent decision ' a of the circuit court of appeals for the
second circuit presents a ruling in federal appellate practice,
which will require cautious exercise of the powers lodged in dis-
trict judges by virtue of Rule 54(b) which permits the entry of
separate judgments as to each claim contained in the pleadings
as they are disposed of by the trial court. The complaint stated
two claims; one for copyright infringement, the other for unfair
competition. A motion to dismiss the first claim, for failure to
make averments upon which relief could be granted, was granted
by the district court. Before disposing of the second claim, the
plaintiff immediately appealed from the order dismissing the
first claim. The circuit court of appeals held that the order was
a final judgment and immediately appealable although the district
court had not disposed of the other claim. The court found its
authority to entertain the appeal in Rule 54(b) .1s7b The circuit
court of appeals considered the basic question to be one of con-
venience; that is, an appeal from a partial disposition of an action
ought to be allowed if it expedited the ultimate determination of
a controversy but should not be allowed if the effect was to com-
plicate the litigation and multiply reviews. The decision, by
implication, acknowledged that the courts have no authority to
decisions of Tighe v. Maryland Casualty Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1938) 99
F. (2d) 727; Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, (C.C.A. 1st
Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 501. The salutary effect of this rule is recognized
in Schaffer v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1939) 101 F.
(2d) 369.
'18 United States Supreme Court Rule 48, 306 U. S. appendix.
187F. R. C. P. 61. Technically this Rule only applies to the district
courts, but it should have a decided psychological influence on the appel-
late courts. Cf. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal
Rules, (1939) 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 551; 3 Moore, Federal Practice (1938)
3289; but see Cervin v. W. T. Grant Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1938) 100 F.
(2d) 153, and in conjunction with F. R. C. P. 61, see 28 U. S. C. secs.
391, 777 and F. R. C. P. 1, 8(f) and 15.
'
8stCollins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corporation, (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1939) 106 F. (2d) 83.
187bRule 63(b) of the Preliminary Draft (1936) expressly provided
that a split-judgment should be final for all purposes including the right to
appeal therefrom. That provision was eliminated in Rule 54 (b) of the
Report of the Advisory Committee (1937), possibly for the reason that
such a provision might have been considered as affecting the jurisdiction of
the appellate courts and, therefore, not within the Committee's power.
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delay appeals but found that district judges have a practical dis-
cretion and power to control such appeals. There can be no
quarrel with the ruling based as it is upon expediency, but the
question of how the district judges can exercise discretion was not
discussed, that problem not being essential to the decision of the
case. In those cases where a demand for a split-judgment prob-
ably will occur most frequently, this practical discretion can be
exercised on a motion to dismiss claims for lack of jurisdiction,
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, etc.,
or for judgment on the pleadingss 7c by deferring hearing and
determination until time of trial ;s7d or where a claim involving
only non-jury issues has been determined, the court may withhold
the findings of fact and conclusions of law until other claims
involving jury issues have been decided.
I. FROM A DIsTRicT COURT TO A CIRCUIT COURT op APPEALs
A. Notice of appeal, bond on appeal and stay of judgment.
Except as to certain proceedings to which the rules have no
application 8 s a simplified procedure has been provided for in
regard to appeals from a district court to a circuit court of ap-
peals."' Petition for appeal, allowance of appeal and citation
are abolished. In their place we have a simple notice of appeal' 90
which must be filed in the district court within the time prescribed
by law. The notice of appeal must specify the parties taking the
appeal, the judgment"'9 or part thereof appealed from and the
court to which the appeal is taken; copies of the notice of appeal
are mailed by the clerk to all parties to the judgment other than
the appellant. 19 2 The notice must be signed in his individual
187cF. R. C. P. 12(b), (c).
187dF. R. C. P. 12(d).
2sF. R. C. P. 81. This rule has been modified so that now the Federal
Rules apply to: (1) bankruptcy proceedings, see General Orders in Bank-
ruptcy, effective February 13, 1939, 36 and 37, 305 U. S. Supp. p. 1; 11
U. S. C. secs. 47, 48; (2) copyright proceedings, see Rule 1 of the Copy-
right Rules, 17 U. S. C. following sec. 53.
189F. R. C. P. 73(a).
lONThis procedure is common in a great many code states; see list in
Advisory Committee's Note to F. R. C. P. 73.
'
9
'The term "judgment" as used in the rules includes a decree and any
order from which an appeal lies. F. R. C. P. 54(a).
102F. R. C. P. 73(b); Appendix of Forms, Form 27. This duty of
notification of the filing of a notice of appeal is similar to the general duty
of the district court clerk to serve copies of all orders and judgments with
notice of entry (F. R. C. P. 77(d)). The failure of the clerk to notify
the parties that an appeal has been taken does not affect the validity of the
appeal (F.R.C.P. 73(b). The district court rules for the southern district
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name by at least one attorney of record for the appellant 193 It
should be noted that the rules as promulgated wisely omit the
provision contained in the Preliminary Draft (May, 1936) that
the notice of appeal had to contain the appellant's assignment of
errors.194  In fact no assignment of errors is required as a pre-
requisite to an appeal. It would seem, therefore, that the strict
limitation formerly placed by the appellate courts on its power
of review, i.e. to the assignment of errors of the appellant, will
no longer be controlling.191 The jurisdictional requirement is the
filing of the notice. Failure of the appellant to take any further
steps to secure review does not affect the validity of the appeal,
and is ground only for such remedies as are specified in the rule,
or when no remedy is specified for "such action as the appellate
court deems appropriate which may include dismissal of the
appeal. 196
The rules probably make a slight change in respect of the
time within which an appeal may be taken. The United States
Judicial Code provides that appeal or writ of certiorari must be
applied for within a specified number of months after the entry
of the judgment or decree to be reviewed.1 97  The federal courts
have uniformly held that while they may construe their own rules
equitably and extend the time specified therein, they have no such
power as to statutes and that when the act is to be done within
a time fixed by statute and the last day thereof falls on a Sunday
or other holiday, that day will not be excluded and, therefore,
of New York (Civil Rule 25) require that the notice of appeal must
exhibit the names and addresses of the respective attorneys of record and
that the appellant must file a sufficient number of copies of the notice of
appeal for mailing by the clerk.
193F. R. C. P. 11 and 7(b)(2).
19 4 Preliminary Draft (May, 1936), Rule 72(b); cf. Ilsen, The Pre-
liminary Draft of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (1937) 11 St. John's
L. Rev. 212, 260.
'1953 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 3406; Sonzinsky v. United States,
(1937) 300 U. S. 506, 514, 57 Sup. Ct. 554, 81 L. Ed. 772: "We do
not discuss petitioner's contentions which he failed to assign below." Cf.
old Rule 10 of the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit and new
Rule 10 of the same circuit, which requires an assignment of errors to be
contained in the brief. This is the proper place for it.
196F. R. C. P. 73(a).
19728 U. S. C. secs. 227, 230 and 350; as to what constitutes "entry"
see F. R. C. P. 58 and 79(a); Siegel v. Margiotta, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1939)
102 F. (2d) 525. But "It [the time for taking an appeal] is stopped by
a motion for new trial, a motion to amend the findings, or by a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to rule 50(b) and
begins running anew upon the determination of such motions. But a mo-
tion pursuant to Rule 60 to gain relief from a judgment or order has no
effect upon appeal time." 3 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 3393 (the
author's footnotes omitted).
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the time will expire on the preceding day which is not a Sunday
or a holiday. 08 The rules provide that ."in computing any period
of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or
by any applicable statute," the last day of such period is to be
included unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event
the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a
Sunday nor a legal holiday.' The Preliminary Draft (May,
1936) stated that the court could not enlarge the time for taking
an appeal, and then specifically stated that the extension provided
for (when the last day fell on a Sunday or holiday) also included
"the time for taking an appeal." 20 0 This phrase was omitted in the
promulgated rules and in its place there was inserted the broader
term "any applicable statute." It would, therefore, seem that
there is a clear intention to change the rule of definition laid down
in the decisions above referred to; but until the Supreme Court
passes on this question the wiser course to follow is not to take
advantage of this apparent extension of time.2 0 1
The provisions as to the requirements of the costs bond (called
the bond on appeal) and the supersedeas bond are clear. Ordi-
narily the costs bond must be in the sum of $250 with adequate
surety (conditioned to pay the costs if the appeal is dismissed or
the judgment affirmed or to pay such costs as the appellate court
may award if the judgment is modified) and must be filed with
the notice of appeal. If a bond on appeal for $250 is given, no
court approval is necessary.20 2 After a bond is filed an appellee
may raise objections to the form of the bond or to the sufficiency
of the surety for determination by the district court clerk.2 03 When
20 sSiegelschiffer v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1917)
248 Fed. 226, cert. denied, Ex parte Siegelschiffer, (1918) 246 U. S. 654,
38 Sup. Ct. 572, 62 L. Ed. 923; Walters v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (C.C.A.
3d Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 599.
lOF. R. C. P. 6(a); the expression "legal holiday" seems ambiguous,
since it does not clearly indicate whether both state and federal holidays
are included; cf. 1 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 405-6, Ilsen, The Pre-
liminary Draft of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (1937) 11 St. John's
L. Rev. 212, 220.20oPreliminary Draft (May, 1936) Rule 7.
2011 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 406-408; Simkins, Federal Prac-
tice (1938) 603. But see Jordan v. Palo Alto Verde Irr. Dist., (C.C.A. 9th
Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 601, 603 extension of time, provided for by F. R.
C. P. 6(a) where last day for doing some act falls on a Sunday, applies
to the filing of a notice of appeal. This rule probably does not apply to
filing petitions for writs of certiorari or appeals from the district courts or
state courts direct to the United States Supreme Court, 28 U. S. C. secs.
350, 723(b) and 723(c).
202F. R. C. P. 73(c); cf. 28 U. S. C. secs. 227, 832, 869, 870 and
6 U. S. C. sec. 6; see Notes of Advisory Committee to F. R. C. P. 73(c).03F. R. C. P. 73(c).
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a supersedeas bond is filed no separate bond on appeal is re-
quired, the supersedeas bond necessarily containing a provision
covering costs.20 4
It is also provided that no execution shall issue upon a judg-
ment nor shall any proceedings be taken for its enforcement until
the expiration of ten days after its entry. Thus there is a short
automatic stay which, however, does not apply to judgments
(interlocutory or final) in an action for an injunction or in a
receivership action, or to a judgment directing an accounting in
an action for infringement of letters patent. In cases of this
sort the judgment or order is not stayed during the period after
its entry and until an appeal is taken or during the pendency of
an appeal except by special order by the court.20 1  There is a
further provision that in any state in which a judgment is a lien
upon the property of the judgment debtor and in which the
judgment debtor is entitled to a stay of execution, a judgment
debtor has the right, in the district court held therein, to such
stay as would be accorded him had the action been maintained
in the courts of that state. Thus in certain jurisdictions the
judgment debtor under these circumstances may be able to obtain
a longer automatic stay than ten days.20 1  Neither the United
States nor any officer or agency thereof acting as such is re-
quired to furnish security; an order granting a stay is sufficient.2
As its name implies, a supersedeas bond is given to effect a
stay of the judgment appealed from.20 8 The rules prescribe sev-
204F. R. C. P. 73 (c), (d).
2O5F. R. C. P. 62(a). The ten day stay begins to run on the day when
judgment is entered (Board of Commr's v. Gorman, (1873) 19 Wall.(U.S.) 661, 22 L. Ed. 226). As to what constitutes "entry" see F. R. C. P.
58 and 79(a) ; as to time computation, see F. R. C. P. 6(a) ; cf. Danielson
v. Northwestern Fuel Co., (C.C. Minn. 1893) 55 Fed. 49, aff'd. (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1893) 57 Fed. 915 interpreting 28 U. S. C. sec. 874 (supersedeas).
The automatic stay applies to an order in a bankruptcy proceeding direct-
ing trustees in bankruptcy to deliver certain personal property to petitioner
which was in bankrupt's possession by virtue of a bailment lease; the order
having been excepted to by one of the opponents, the trustees were justified
in refusing to comply with the terms of the order before expiration of the
ten day period prescribed in Rule 62(a), United States, now for the Use of
Manufacturers Equipment Co., (W. D. Pa., 1939) 29 F. Supp. 40.
2SF. R. C. P. 62(f); cf. N. Y. C. P. A. sec. 615 ". . . Execution
of-a judgment for the recovery of money only shall not be stayed with-
out security for more than thirty days after the service upon the attorney
for the appellant of a copy of a judgment and written notice of the entry
thereof." Such stay, however, must be granted in open court at the close
of the trial or by special order procured and served, N. Y. C. P. R.
203; The Island Queen, (D.C.W.D. Pa. 1907) 152 Fed. 470.207F. R. C. P. 62(e).208Hovey v. McDonald, (1883) 109 U. S. 150, 159, 3 Sup. Ct. 136, 27
L. Ed. 888.
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eral different methods of obtaining a stay of a judgment pending
appeal. The choice of method depends upon the type of judg-
ment appealed from. The significant categories are:
a. Judgments for the recovery of money not otherwise se-
cured. The rule first lays down the generally recognized practice
that if the appellant desires a stay on appeal, he must -present
to the court for approval a supersedeas bond conditioned (a) for
the satisfaction of the judgment in full together with costs,
(b) interest and (c) damages for delay, if for any reason the
appeal is dismissed or the judgment affirmed, and (d) to satisfy
in full such modification of the judgment and such costs, inter-
est and damages as the appellate court may adjudge and award.20 9
This rule also contains an eminently fair provision, which is
entirely new, giving the court after notice and hearing and for
good cause shown the power to fix a different amount or order
security other than the bond.210
b. Judgments determining the disposition of the property in
controversy as in (a) real actions, (b) replevin, (c) actions to
foreclose iortgages, or (d) when such property is in the custody
of the marshal, or (e) when the proceeds of such property or a
bond for its value is in the custody or control of the court. In
such cases the amount of the supersedeas bond must be fixed at
such sum as will secure (1) the amount recovered for the use
and detention of the property, (2) the costs of the action, (3)
costs on appeal, (4) interest and (5) damages for delay.211
c. Judgments (interlocutory or final) in an action for an in-
2-°F. R. C. P. 73(d). The local rules of the Southern District of New
York prescribe the amount of the bond as follows: (1) the face amount
of the judgment, (2) 11 per cent of the judgment (to cover interest and
damages on delay) and $250 (to cover costs); there are also detailed pro-
visions as to the method of applying for the bond, notice to the appellee and
that the bond may be executed by the surety only (S.D. N.Y. Civil Rule 28).
2OF. R. C. P. 73(d). "That last clause was put in there to cover
cases (some of which were brought to the attention of the Advisory Com-
mittee) where money judgments had been entered against defendants in
enormous sums and they were utterly unable to give a supersedeas bond
to stay the execution of the judgment-they did not have sufficient assets.
Their right of appeal and stay was practically destroyed, and this allows
the court in a case of hardship of that kind, on notice and hearing, to de-
termine what the security ought to be. I should think that in such a case
the court would probably find out the size of appellant's pocketbook and
fix the bond accordingly. Certainly if he pledges every penny he has in
the world, he oughtn't to be restrained in his right of appeal." General
Mitchell in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Proceedings of the
American Bar Association Institute (Cleveland, 1938) 361: Such a pro-
vision is not contained in the new Supreme Court Rules (306 U.S.
Appendix), cf. Rule 36 (2).21lCf. Sup. Ct. Rule 36 (2).
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junction or in a receivership action or a judgment or order direct-
ing an accounting in an action for infringement of letters patent.
With respect to judgments in receivership actions and judg-
ments or orders directing an accounting in actions for infringe-
ments of letters patent, the rules provide for no automatic stay
and further state that no stay can be granted, except by order of
the court. 212 When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or
final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction,
there is likewise no automatic stay, but the court in its discretion
may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the
pendency of the appeal upon such terms as to bond or otherwise
as it considers proper for the security of the adverse party.
213
Special provision is made for judgments by a three-judge court.214
The supersedeas bond may be given at or after the time of
filing the notice of appeal or of procuring the order allowing the
appeal.215 A stay pending appeal is not effective until the bond
has been approved by the district court or an order granting
a stay and approving a bond (if a bond is required by the court)
has been entered. 1 6 These provisions demand a prompt appeal
if a stay is desired, as they preclude the giving of a supersedeas
bond or the granting of a stay order with or without bond as the
case may be, until the appeal has been taken. 21.7 Otherwise, execu-
tion may issue or other proceedings for enforcement may be begun
(dependent upon the character of the judgment) either after the
expiration of ten days2 18 or of the state stay provisions 2' 9 or imme-
diately upon entry of the judgment. 2 0  A stay is not retroactive
and does not void prior levies or proceedings.
221
If the bond on appeal or the supersedeas bond is not filed
212F. R. C. P. 62(a).
21SF. R. C. P. 62(c); Shinholt v. Angle, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1937) 90
F. (2d) 297, 298, cert. denied (1937) 302 U. S. 719, 58 Sup. Ct. 40, 82 L.
Ed. 555; cf. Equity Rule 74, which did not "include cases when an injunction,
or a restraining order has been refused," New York Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall
(E.D. La. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 172, aff'd without discussion of the point
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 225, cert. denied (1928) 277 U. S. 587,
48 Sup. Ct. 434, 72 L. Ed. 1001.2 14F. R. C. P. 62(c) ; cf. Cumberland Telephone Co. v. Public Service
Commission (1922) 260 U. S. 212, 219, 43 Sup. Ct. 75, 67 L. Ed. 217,
3 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 3298-9.
215F. R. C. P. 62(d).
216F. R. C. P. 62(a), (c) and (d).
217F. R. C. P. 62(a), (c) and (d); cf. stay on motions for new trial
or judgment F. R. C. P. 62(b).21SF. R. C. P. 62(a).
219F. R. C. P. 62(f).
220F. R. C. P. 62 (a), (c) and (d).
2213 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 3300 and cases cited.
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within the time specified or if the bond is found insufficient, a
bond may be filed before the action is docketed in the appellate
court within a time limit fixed by the district court; after the
action is so docketed, application for leave for filing a bond may
be made only in the appellate court.2 2 2  But as previously stated,
insufficiency of bond or failure to furnish bond does not affect
the validity of the appeal. 223
The power of the appellate court or of a judge thereof to stay
proceedings are not limited by the provisions of Rule 62, and it
is further provided that
"these rules do not supersede the provisions of section 210 of the
Judicial Code, as amended, U. S. C. Title 28, sec. 47a, or of other
statutes of the United States to the effect that stays pending ap-
peals to the Supreme Court may be granted only by that court or
a justice thereof. 221 4
A new remedy, cumulative and not exclusive, has been provided
for, to the effect that by entering into an appeal or supersedeas
bond -2 2 5 the surety submits himself to the jurisdiction of the
court so that his liability may be enforced on motion without the
necessity of an independent action.2 2, The motion, upon such
notice as the court may prescribe, may be served on the district
court clerk, who must forthwith mail. copies to the surety if his
address is known.
B. Docketing and Preparation of Record on Appeal.
The disability of district courts in actions at law to settle a bill
of exceptions after the term or any extension thereof for that
purpose had expired, 2 2 has been removed. The rules laid down in
respect of equity cases as to the time a record on appeal should be
prepared did not state that it had to be done within the term or
222F. R. C. P. 73(e). "This is incorporated to make clear the extent
of the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain motions for failure to
file or for insufficiency of a bond on appeal or a supersedeas bond" (Notes
of Advisory Committee to this Rule). As to "the time specified" see
F. R. C. P. 62(c) and (d).223Supra, p. 38.
224F. R. C. P. 62(g).
22SF R. C. P. 73(c) and (d).
2z,6F. R. C. P. 73(f) ; see generally 6 U. S. C., which contains complete
provisions for sureties, and Notes of Advisory Committee to F. R. C. P.
73(f).
227F. R. C. P. 73(f).
2sMichigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, (1892) 143 U. S. 293, 12 Sup. Ct. 450,
36 L. Ed. 162; O'Connell v. ,United States, (1920) 253 U. S. 142, 40 Sup.
Ct. 44, 64 L. Ed. 827; Exporters v. Butterworth-Judson Co., (1922) 258
U. S. 365, 42 Sup. Ct. 331, 66 L. Ed. 663; United States v. Rasmussen,
(C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 842.
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any extension thereof, but local court rules caused some diffi-
culty." 9  Any such question has also been removed. It is now
stated that the period of time provided for the doing of any act
or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the
expiration of a term of court. The expiration of a term of court
furthermore in no way affects the power of the court to do any
act or take any proceeding. 230 Thus a technical rule of procedure
has been laid to rest.
The new rules place emphasis on the docketing in the appellate
court and not on the term of court in which the judgment was
rendered, and provide that within forty days from the date of
the notice of appeal unless otherwise ordered, the record on
appeal must be filed with the circuit court of appeals and the
action there docketed. 231 If more than one appeal is taken from
the judgment, the district court may prescribe the time for filing
and docketing, which in no event shall be less than forty days from
the date of the first notice of appeal. 212  Regardless of the num-
ber of appeals from the same judgment, the district court has
discretion before the expiration of any period, with or without
notice, to extend the time for filing and docketing but not beyond
a day more than ninety days from the date of the first notice of
appeal. 22 The ninety day limitation should not, however, prevent
the circuit court of appeals from granting an extension beyond
this period.234
22 9Equity Rule 75; Barber Asphalt Co. v. Standard Co., (1928) 275
U. S. 372, 48 Sup. Ct. 183, 72 L. Ed. 318; but see old General Rules of
the district court of the southern district of New York, Rule 35(b) and
Woodbury v. Jergens, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 736.
230F. R. C. P. 6(c); see Sprague v. Taconic Nat'l Bank (1939) 59
Sup. Ct. 777, 781.
231F. R. C. P. 73(g).
232F. R. C. P. 73(g).
233F. R. C. P. 73(g); compare F. R. C. P. 6(b), which provides that
the district court, for cause shown, "at any time" may upon motion permit
the act to be done after the expiration of the specified period where the
failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. This possible variance
in the language has been explained as an oversight, and it has been sug-
gested that F. R. C. P. 6(b) should govern so long as the 90-day limita-
tion of F. R. C. P. 73(g) is complied with. 1 Moore, Federal Practice
(1938) 411 et seq. Whether a circuit court of appeals will grant an exten-
sion of time terminating within the 90-day period prescribed by F. R. C. P.
73(g) depends on its own rules. In the Second Circuit, the court will not
hear such a motion, unless an extension of time for filing and docketing
the record has first been denied by the district court. Rule 15 of Rules for
the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit.234For instance, the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit (Rule
15) will extend the time beyond the 90-day limitation, if application on due
notice is made, however, such extension will be granted only upon a showing
that the delay is due to a cause beyond the control of the moving party, or,
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It will be noted that the rule states that the period is to be
computed from the "date" of the notice of appeal.235  Inasmuch
as another rule236 (specifying the contents of the record on appeal)
provides that the notice of appeal "with the date of filing" shall
be included in the record on appeal, and the Advisory Committee's
form of notice of appeal does not provide for the notice to be
dated,237 it would seem that "date" means the date of filing.2 8
Promptly 35 after notice of appeal has been filed, the appellant
must serve upon the appellee and file with the district court a
designation of the portions of the record, proceedings, and evi-
dence to be contained in the record on appeal. 240  This designation
should contain copies of (1) the material pleadings without
unnecessary duplication; (2) the verdict or the findings of fact and
conclusions of law together with direction for the entry of judg-
ment thereon; (3) in an action tried without a jury, the master's
report, if any; (4) the opinion; (5) the judgment or part thereof
appealed from; (6) the notice of appeal with date of filing; and
(7) the designations as to other matter to be included in the
record. 24
1
Testimony of witnesses designated for inclusion need not be
in narrative form, but may be in question and answer form.
242
Thus the narrative form of record formerly prescribed (except
where verbatim testimony was necessary to a right appreciation
thereof) 243 and properly criticized244 is no longer mandatory.
if there is a substantial question to be presented on appeal, that the delay
is due to excusable neglect.23
-F. R. C. P. 73(g).
230F. R. C. P. 75(g).23 7Appendix of Forms, Form 27.
-
3sIn accord with this conclusion, but based upon different reasoning,
see In the Matter of Guanajuato Reduction and Mines Company, Debtor,
(D. N.J. Oct. 1939, not yet reported). Cf. 3 Moore, Federal Practice(1938) 3396 (footnote) where an opposite view seems to be taken: "Since
subd. (g) makes the period of time for docketing the case and filing the
record with appellate court run from the date (not filing) of the notice of
appeal, careful counsel will see that the notice bears date as of the day of
filing."
239Keeping in mind the time within which the record must be docketed,
see F. R. C. P. 73(g).
240F. R. C. P. 75(a).
24'F. R. C. P. 75(g). These documents must be transmitted to the
appellate court whether or not designated.
42F. R. C. P. 75(c).
24301d United States Supreme Court Rule VIII and Equity Rules 75
and 76; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Standard Asphalt & Rubber Co.,
(1928) 275 U. S. 372, 48 Sup. Ct. 183, 72 L. Ed. 318; Alexander v. Cosden,
(1934) 290 U. S. 484, 54 Sup. Ct. 292, 78 L. Ed. 452.244Lane, Federal Equity Rules, (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 276; Gris-
wold and Mitchell, The Narrative Record in Federal Equity Appeals,
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The United States Supreme Court has also adopted this change
in its new rules.2 4' An appellant may, however, still prepare and
file with his designation a condensed statement in narrative form
of all or part of the testimony and any other party to the appeal,
if dissatisfied with the narrative statement, may require testimony
in question and answer form to be substituted. 2" For the un-
necessary substitution by one party of evidence in question and
answer form for a fair narrative statement proposed by an-
other, the appellate court may withhold or impose costs, and costs
may be imposed upon offending attorneys or parties.2
47
It is further provided that all matter not essential to the deci-
sion of the questions presented shall be omitted as well as formal
parts of all exhibits; more than one copy of any document must
likewise be excluded.24 s The penalty is the same as where an
appellee unnecessarily counter-proposes testimony in question and
answer form where a fair narrative form has already been pro-
posed.
If any evidence or proceedings at a trial or hearing was
stenographically reported, the appellant must file with his designa-
tion two copies of the reporter's transcript of the evidence or
proceedings included in his designation and also two copies of
the transcript of the evidence or proceedings not included in his
designation.249  One of such copies must be available for use
(1) of the other parties and (2) in the appellate court in print-
ing the record.
2 0
A quasi assignment of errors still survives. If the appellant
does not designate for inclusion the complete record and all the
proceedings and evidence in the action, he must serve with his
designation a concise statement of the points on which he intends
to rely on the appeal.25
(1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 483; Lane, Twenty Years under the Federal
Equity Rules, (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 638; Severn, Practical Results of
Federal Equity Rule 75(b) as to Restatement of Testimony in Narrative,
(1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 1093; Stone, The Record on Appeal in Civil
Cases. (1937) 23 Va. L. Rev. 766.
245This provision has been incorporated by reference in ,United States
Supreme Court Rule 10(2).
246F. R. C. P. 75 (c).
247F. R. C. P. 75(e) ; U. S. Sup. Ct. Rule 10(2).
248F. R. C. P. 75(e); there is no provision for the abridgment of
formal parts of any pleadings or judgments; cf. F. R. C. P. 10(a), Equity
Rule 76.
249F. R. C. P. 75(b).
250F. R. C. P. 75(b).
251F. R. C. P. 75(d); that this subdivision should not be considered
to be an assignment of errors for appellate review see 3 Moore, Federal
Practice (1938) 3406. The proper place for an assignment of errors is in
the brief in the appellate court.
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Within ten days after the appellant has served and filed his
designation as above described, any other party to the appeal
may serve and file a designation of any additional portions of the
record, proceedings and evidence to be included. 25 2
It is not necessary for the record on appeal to be approved
by the district court or judge; if, however, any difference arises
as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the
district court, the difference is to be submitted to and settled by
that court and the record made to conform to the truth.25 3  Pro-
vision is also made for the insertion of anything material to
either party which has been omitted from the record on appeal by
error or accident or is misstated therein.2 54 Furthermore, when-
ever the district court is of opinion that original papers or ex-
hibits should be inspected by the appellate court or sent to the
appellate court in lieu of copies, it may provide so by order.255
Duplication of records is also avoided by the provision that
when more than one appeal is taken to the same court froin the
same judgment, a single record on appeal must be prepared con-
taining all the matter designated or agreed upon by the parties,
without duplication.
258
A simple method of preparing the record on appeal (and one
that should be followed in most appeals) is for the parties, with-
252F. R. C. P. 75(a). The southern and eastern districts of New York
have made unwarranted additions to this rule (Civil Rules 29 to 31) ; cf.
General Mitchell in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Proceedings
of the Institutes, Washington and New York, Published by Amer. Bar
Ass'n referring to Civil Rule 31 (providing for service of the record on
appeal in printed or typed form within 30 days after appeal, and motion
to correct record within ten days thereafter) at p. 326 ". . . there is
one relating to the record on appeal that disturbs me very considerably.
I think it is safe to say that this authority to the district court to supple-
ment the Supreme Court Rules with local rules was not intended to au-
thorize the enactment of supplemental rules on matters where the field was
adequately covered and all the necessary steps provided for in the rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court. If you construe the authority to make
local rules to be that broad, . . . the district court could tack onto the
federal rules all the meticulous details of the New York Civil Practice
Act that could be carried out without running directly contrary to the
Supreme Court Rules .... Now you see [after quoting Civil Rule 31], the
district court in this district in addition to all the steps provided for in
the Supreme Court Rule has tacked on additional steps that have to be
taken. . . . It tends to destroy uniformity in practice throughout the
United States. The lawyers in this district will have to comply with this
district court rule as long as it stands, because otherwise a record will not
be certified by the clerk." Cf. Ilsen, The Preliminary Draft of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, (1937) 11 St. John's L. Rev. 212, 268.
253F. R. C. P. 75(h) ; this subdivision has been incorporated by refer-
ence in U. S. Sup. Ct. Rule 10(2).
254F. R. C. P. 75(h) ; cf. Equity Rule 76.
25SF. R. C. P. 75(i).
2-F. R. C. P. 75(k).
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out serving designations as above provided, to stipulate in a
writing filed with the district court clerk the parts of the record,
proceedings and evidence to be included in the record on appeal.22
When all this has been done, and it is in fact quite simple, the
district court clerk under his hand and the seal of the court trans-
mits to the appellate court the designated or stipulated matter
which constitutes the record on appeal. 8 An additional copy
must be transmitted for use in printing the record on appeal if a
copy is required by the rules of the circuit court of appeals. 2 9
It is also provided that if by reason of death, sickness or
other disability,260 a judge before whom an action has been tried
is unable to perform his required duties after a verdict is returned
or findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed, then any other
judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the court in which the
action was tried may perform those duties; but if such other
judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those duties because he
did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may in
his discretion grant a new trial.
261
Except for abolishing the compulsory narrative statement,
the procedure outlined is almost precisely the system prescribed
by the old Equity Rules and supersedes U. S. C. Title 28, sec. 876
providing for bills of exceptions, authentication and signing by the
trial judge. The old distinction in law cases between the record
proper and the proceedings and evidence on the trial is abolished
and the method of bringing matters not of "strict record" into
the record on appealS62 becomes unnecessary. This change is a
decided improvement. As has been previously shown 2 13 the
"exception" as such has been eliminated but in its place we find
the "objection." Thus "for all purposes for which an exception
has heretofore been necessary" (this would seem to include some
of the requirements of a bill of exceptions) it will be sufficient that
a party at the time the ruling or order was made or sought, makes
257F. R. C. P. 75(f).
25SF. R. C. P. 75(g).
259F. R. C. P. 75(g).
260"Disability" includes inability because of resignation, McIntyre v.
Modern Woodmen of America, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1912) 200 Fed. 1, but does
not include mere absence from the district (Western Dredging & Improve-
ment Co. v. Heldmaier, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1901) 111 Fed. 123.
261F. R. C. P. 63; this Rule supersedes 28 U. S. C. sec. 776; see also
28 U. S. C. sec. 25.
262Cf. Baltimore & Pot. R. R. Co. v. Trustees, etc., (1875) 91 U. S.
127, 130, 23 L. Ed. 260; Reed v. Gardner, (1873) 84 U. S. 409, 411, 21
L. Ed. 665.213Supra, p. 5.
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known to the court the action which he desires the court to take
or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds there-
for. In view of this provision it seems probable that a necessary
prerequisite to review by the appellate court will be a proper
objection "for all purposes for which an exception has hereto-
fore been necessary" and, therefore, such exception or "objec-
tion" as it is now called, will be as formerly a necessary prerequisite
to review by an appellate court.2 6 4  The bill of exceptions, fur-
thermore, has not been entirely abolished by the new rules of
the Supreme Court of the United States.265
Even though the record on appeal is prepared by the district
court clerk2 6 he does not supervise its printing. What part of
the record on appeal filed in the appellate court must be printed
and the manner of the printing and the supervision thereof is to
be prescribed in the rules of the court to which the appeal is
taken.267  Thus it is left to the determination of the appellate
courts whether the appeal is to be heard on typewritten or printed
records. The type, paper and dimensions of printed matter in
the circuit court of appeals, however, must conform to the rules of
the Supreme Court relating to records on appeal to that court, not-
withstanding any rules of the circuit courts of appeal to the
contrary.
-6
A skeleton record for preliminary use in the appellate court
is also provided for where a party desires to move for dismissal,
264Stone, The Record on Appeal in Civil Cases, (1937) 23 Va. L. Rev.
766; Suydam v. Williamson, (1857) 20 How. (U.S.) 427, 15 L. Ed. 978;
Phelps v. Mayer, (1853) 15 How. (U.S.) 159, 14 L. Ed. 643; and John-
son v. Garber, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1896) 73 Fed. 523; but see 3 Moore,
Federal Practice (1938) 3406.: As to evidence in equity cases, see United
States Supreme Court Rule 16 and Hoyt v. Hanbury, (1888) 128 U. S.
584, 9 Sup. Ct. 176, 32 L. Ed. 565.
21Supreme Court Rule 8: "Bills of Exceptions-Charges to Jury-
Omission of Unnecessary Evidence." It does not seem probable that this
rule requires a bill of exceptions in all jury cases where the parties contem-
plate review by the Supreme Court. F. R. C. P. 75(h) has been incorpor-
ated by reference in Supreme Court Rule 10(2). One possibility is that at
times the parties may still desire a bill of exceptions and if so, the rule must
be complied with; but some doubt is justified. The more reasonable ex-
planation of the reference in Supreme Court Rule 8 to bills of exceptions is
the fact that in some criminal cases a bill of exceptions is still necessary and
must conform to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 8. See Rule IX
of the Rules of Practice and Procedure in criminal cases in the district courts.
2 36F. R. C. P. 75(g).
2 7F. R. C. P. 75(l).
20SF. R. C. P. 75() ; see copious notes of the Advisory Committee to
this subdivision; cf. Rules 13, 22 and 25 of the circuit court of appeals
for the second circuit, which require printing and that party filing record
on appeal "shall cause the same to be printed."
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stay pending appeal, for additional security on the bond (appeal
or supersedeas) or for any intermediate order.269
Finally, the rules give the parties the right to use an agreed
statement showing how the questions arose and were decided in
the district court and setting forth only such facts averred and
proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of
the questions. But this statement must include (a) a copy of the
judgment appealed from, (b) a copy of the notice of appeal with
its filing date, and (c) a concise statement of the points to be
relied on by the appellant, and must be approved by the district
court, together with such additions as the court may consider
necessary fully to present the questions raised by the appeal,
before it can be certified to the appellate court as the record on
appeal.270 Of course no hypothetical cases may be submitted.
II. FRoM A DISTRICT COURT TO THE SUPREME COURT
The provisions heretofore considered, except as indicated,
applied only to review of district court cases by the circuit courts
of appeal. The rules, however, in a limited way also deal with
appeals from a district court to the Supreme Court. In this
respect, the practice existing prior to the effective date of the
rules, has been codified.2 7 1  Thus, under this rule, we still have
petition for appeal accompanied by an assignment of errors, allow-
ance of appeal, issuance of citation, filing of jurisdictional state-
ment, taking of appeal bond and supersedeas bond, making and
certification of the record as prescribed by law and the rules of
the Supreme Court. The Advisory Committee had hoped that
this procedure would be abolished by the Supreme Court when
it would revise its rules, so as to conform to the simple method
prescribed for criminal appeals.2 7 2  Its hope, however, has not
been fulfilled, since the new rules of the United States Supreme
Court have not been changed in this respect.272 The Supreme
2 69 F. R. C. P. 75(j).
270F. R. C. P. 76. This Rule sets out in clearer terms the provisions of
Equity Rule 77; see also 3 Moore, Federal Practice (1938), 3409, and
Mitchell, Federal Rules of Procedure and Proceedings of the American Bar
Ass'n Institute (Cleveland, 1938) 367-368.
271F R. C. P. 72.
272Note of Advisory Committee to Rule 62 of Draft of April, 1937;
see also Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected By The New Federal Rules,
II, (1939) 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 579.
273Rules 10, 12, 46 and 47 of the Sup. Ct. (1939) 306 U. S. appendix;
as to statutes continued in effect see Notes of Advisory Conmuttee to
F. R. C. P. 72.
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Court in its revised rules has made only those alterations with
respect to summons and severance and the record which have been
previously noted.2"74
From the foregoing discussion it would appear self-evident
that the procedure relating to appellate review as laid down by
the new rules is a decided improvement over the federal practice
theretofore existing. Simplicity and the elimination of the old
pitfalls have been the- objectives sought. Much, indeed, has been
accomplished in that direction. It is to be hoped that the courts
in applying and interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
will recognize the great importance of that goal.
-
7 4Some other revision, of course, has been made, not affecting how-
ever this discussion.
